POST-SOVIET NATIONALISM

Preamble

Ethno-nationalism has played a two-fold role and demonstrated contradictory implications on political realm and on civic life of the region. On one hand, the rise of ethnic identities and of ethnopolitics was a major factor behind a decisive move apart of unitarian state and of enforced Communist ideology. Nationalities movements have contributed preserving cultural integrity and became a basis for mass political mobilisations for the sake of democratic reforms and of establishing self-governing civic societies. Nationalism in its cultural and political forms provides an important integral component for the process of nation-building taking now place in newly emerged states.

On the other hand, for recent years this area of the Globe became an arena of most destructive ethnic wars, cleansing and violence causing thousands of killed and millions of displaced people, huge material losses and widely radiated political instability. Ethno-nationalism legitimised activities of ethnic entrepreneurs, it enforced violations of human rights, stimulated irresponsible political behaviour and a growth of xenophobia and intolerance. Ethnic nationalism and conflicts became one of major obstacles for reforms and modernisation. Nationalism being a pivotal for the appearance of new polities at the same time transformed itself into a serious challenge for all successor states because it subverses their sovereignty, integrity and questions an ability to provide for the peoples on behalf of which it operates an appropriate living conditions and social order. The horrors in the ex-Yugoslavia, "when under the slogan of democratisation the governments of all the republics have made their lands unmistakably poorer and their people unhappier"(1) could be easily traced on the territory of the former Soviet Union where at least a dozen of areas badly damaged by ethnic conflicts and internal wars.

At the moment there are two approaches dominate academic and public discourse in interpretation accomplished dramatic changes and ongoing processes. One is a paradigm of "fallen empire" and of "national revival" sees the main reason for the breakdown of the former Soviet Union in its illegitimate imperial character and explains nationalism and conflicts as an implementation of irresistible strife of the people for national self-determination. Another model seeks for answers in improper ("non-scientific") Soviet nationality policy, in "neobolsheviks" strategy of political radicals realising scenarios composed in the West or by internal "enemies". Both approaches suffer simplification and reflect either inertia of Cold war warriors celebrating liberal victory or the legacies of Marxist determinism and of impire-savers' conservative rhetoric. Here we suggest to look at the phenomenon of nationalism not as "phenomenon" per se that is something holistic what we "know" and what can be defined in a textbook formula but as a series of postulates and episodes formulated and initiated by activists of a social space.

Nationalism in its ethnic form, or ethno-nationalism, is based on a set of simplistic but powerful myths which had been thoroughly elaborated and imposed into Soviet political practice. As Zbigniew Brzezinski noted, "although Communism declared itself to be an international doctrine, in fact it fostered nationalist sentiments among the people"(2). There are many reasons why ethnicity and nationalism reigned supreme and became crucial factors in burring the Soviet Union and in destroying its empire in Eastern Europe. A large amount of scholarly and enlightening journalism texts has already been produced to present "objective" interpretations of "objective" courses for a recent "the wrath of nations"(3). It may be enriching to look more carefully at the doctrinal domain and at its practitioners.

Doctrinal academic nationalism

A key element of this doctrine is a notion of nation as it was defined by a the Grand Soviet Encyclopaedia as "a historical entity of people which emerges in a process of formation its territory, economic ties, literary language and specifics of culture and character comprising at a whole a nation's features"(4). This formula had little difference from those given by Stalin many decades ago as well as its latest scholarly modifications added one more element but important one, that is a feeling of common identity ("national self-consciousness"). Thus, Soviet nations were defined basically in ethno-cultural terms referring to a commonality of history, culture and language and to a certain "ethnic territory" supposed to be their "own" land - an exclusive property of a nation so far it comprises one of its basic characteristics. Why the Bolsheviks and Soviet scholarship has opted for ethno-nations scenario is not a simple question: partly it was influenced by East-European social democrats, especially by Austria-Marxists like Rennan, Bauer an Kautski; partly, it was a political motivation to meet a serious challenge from the ethnic periphery of the Russian empire. But from the very beginning of the Soviet rule a recognition of ethno-nations as an element of official ideology has demanded serious social engineering to implement the idea into practice or, to be precise, to construct realities corresponding political myths and intellectual exercises.

First, it demanded to inventory or to invent a nomenclature of these nations in a country where a cultural mosaic has never had before rigid boundaries and ethnicity was overpowered by other forms of identities like clan and dynastic affiliations, religion, regional/local identities. For that purpose the first Soviet census included a question on "nationality" in its ethnic meaning and this experiment has produced spectaclous results with about 200 different identities peoples demonstrated being asked "who were they?" This list immediately became a subject of scholarly exercises and of political manipulations and it was stayed as such for the whole Soviet period up to nowadays. Ethnographers, linguists, historians had input a lot of efforts to redefine the list in "a proper way" declaring some identities as "dialectic", "subethnic", "local" variants of larger "ethnoses" about which ordinary people often did not hear or did not feel like being a part of. A lot of new names were given and many renaming took place to label all "Soviet nations and narodnosts" (the last definition was invented to introduce internal hierarchy for ethnic groups). Thus, "pomors" and "Cossacks" were listed officially as "Russians", "Turks" and "Tatars" in Trancaucasus as "Azerbaijanis", "Sarts" and "Bukharzi" as "Uzbeks", Pamirs mountainous groups as "non-tadjik speaking Tadjiks", etc. But a prevailing idea among ethnic engineers has been reflected in academic elaboration of "ethnic processes" like "consolidation" or "integration". A political motive behind of it was to minimise a number of ethnic units as potential claimants for further, more advanced recognition on a part of a state.

Another underlying idea of nationalism in its Soviet context was deriving from the previous postulate: if a nation has its own territory possible to define in geographical terms then state formations as territorial units could exist only as "national-state formations". As Ernest Gellner pointed, "nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent"(5). Ethno-nations could become as a political fact only through their territorialization and through assigning them officially recognised administrative status. That is why poorly configured by desperate efforts of ethnographers ethnic territories were chosen as guiding maps for the Soviet state-building. As Ronald Suny noted, it was the only state in the World where the ethnic principle was a basis of its administrative structure(6). The doctrinal logic behind this project was reflected in a theory of "socialist federalism" radically differed from "bourgeois"(read - territorial) federalism and meant making a federal state of "national(read - ethnic) states" granted all major Soviet nationalities but the most numerous and dominant one - Russians. That is how the Soviet Union was constructed and at the moment of its demise it included 53 national state formations of different levels - from union republics to autonomous districts. Every territorial autonomy or "national state" was proclaimed as a form of realisation of the right to "national self-determination" for the "indigenous nation". The last one was granted a titular status reflected in the very title of the state formation. Demography was not important: a titular nationality could comprise a decisive majority or a striking minority and nobody was able to challenge this status from below while it was sanctioned from above. And from "above" it was not only originally constituted but often also arbitrary abolished, volintaristically reorganised and spatially reshaped.

A third element of nationalism is an image of a nation as a homogeneous entity, a kind of collective individual with its common blood and soul, with its primordial rights and a single will. As it was elaborated in many Soviet academic texts, a nation is a highest type of ethnos which achieved such a level of economic, political and cultural integration that it could be defined as "ethno-social organism"(7). For many decades this 'organic' vision of ethnicity has acquired deep emotional and political legimization. For Soviet individual it was only belonging to a specific nation could bring proper status and rights exactly as the party membership could guarantee carrier promotion and power prestige. Equally, under totalitarian rule ethnic belonging (or nationality) could be a mean of mass manipulations, of political control and repression. That is why the Soviet state invented a procedure of official registering ethnic identities for all citizens through a system of internal passports which was introduced in 1934 and still not abolished practically all over the territory of the former Soviet Union.

The ideology of ethnic collectivism is the most authoritarian element of nationalism because it presuppose the superiority of "interests of nations" which could be established only when someone is found to be its interpreter. "The reification of a community introduces (or preserves) fundamental inequality between those of its members who are qualified to interpret the collective will and the many who have no such qualification; the select few dictates to the masses who must obey"(8). There was a whole industry of making elites among ethnic groups, including "national" poets, writers, artists, filmmakers, academicians, who were constructing myths of a nation. Among these mobilising myths the most popular and universal were ones about the "ethnogenesis" of a nation since upper-Palaeolithic times, about the ancient and glorious past history, about "flourishing nation" in a brotherhood of other Soviet nations, etc. Brzezinski was right, when he pointed this feature of Soviet nationalism: "Nationalism was thereby nurtured, rather than diluted, in the Communist experience"(9).

For many decades under the Soviet regime the doctrine of ethno-nationalism, including the right of nations, "ethno-nations" in the Soviet context, to self-determination up to secession was incorporated into the constitution and preached in propaganda. In reality, a strong unitarian political regime existed and the whole political process, including interethnic relations, was under strict control. In addition, in spite of a long list of crimes committed by the previous regime toward ethnic groups and nationalities, enormous resources were put into comprehensive programmes of supporting ethnic cultures. No ethnic groups disappeared from the map of the Soviet Union during the whole 20th century and cultural mosaic was thoroughly documented, academically described and staged in a repertoire of numerous national dramas and operas, museum expositions, folk music and dance groups. This policy of breeding local cultures, the professional elite, intellectuals and managerial cadres was leading soon or latter a situation when a powerful material and symbolic basis constructed by Soviet nationalism could challenge its predominantly cultural forms of articulations and its declarative political opportunities. Soon or latter ethnically oriented nationalism should demonstrate its contradictory nature prone many ugly things and hardly predictable outcomes. Asbjorn Eide, a Director of Norwegian Institute for Human rights, wrote on several dangers inherent in ethno-nationalism: "It can be expansionist, exclusivist, and/or secessionist. In all of these modes it generates conflicts, sometimes with grave consequences for peace and for human rights"(10)

Hegemonic nationalism

We are not proponents of generalisations and of based on it typological scholastics so beloved by those who incline to attract readers by a seemingly analytical power and who looks for a broad and mystic formulas being suggested from above for rank-and-file audience. Nevertheless, it is useful to describe the nationalisms in and after the Soviet Union in a certain order taking as a starting point its hegemonic behaviour. This doctrinal feature (some may call it a "type" of nationalism) is more often attached to expansionist or suppressive attitudes of dominant ethnic groups towards other ethnic states or internal ethnic minorities. Two most obvious examples for the ex-Communist world are Russian and Serbian nationalisms usually interpreted by experts and observers as a manifestation of ambitions and interests on a part of "empirial nation" to defend or to acquire a privileged status at the expense of others. Because hegemonic nationalism is a nationalism of majority, that is of titular groups, its elements could be easily traced among dominant groups of the former Soviet republics, now independent states, as well. What are the major postulates and political implications of that nationalist scenario?

Russian nationalism has a long history going back the times of the tsarist empire. Its ideas and manifestations were initiated by a narrow strata of intellectual and political figures pretending to speak on behalf of Russian people or nation(11). Russian nationalism was collectivist and authoritarian by its character, but not purely ethnic by its appeal. Not only because major advocates of the Russian nation were often not ethnic Russian, like Pushkin, Karamzin, Aksakov, Struve and many others, but because first of all the very notion of people ("narod") and nation was used with adjectives "Rossian" or "Russian" which were considered as a synonym for the state not ethnic group. Before the Bolsheviks came to power a hegemonic nationalism in Russia has been carrying strong elements of civic nationalism but a process of civic nation-building in Russia was not completed and was abrupt by a new regime opted for an ethnic formula of nation-building.

The idea of Russian nation in its ethnic meaning (as people of the same blood, culture and "spirit") has been elaborated and introduced into public discourse rather recently as a logic ingredient of the project explicitly called in official propaganda and academic language as "building of Soviet nations". This new nomenclature could not be considered completed without representation of a "great Russian nation". Its glory, deep historical roots, mystique soul and other nationalistic rhetoric has been deliberately provoked by Stalin in a period of the Second world war as a part of war mobilisation but the founding fathers of this new Russian ethno-nationalism were academic and literary writers. Till the late 60th nationalist paradigm was carrying predominantly patriotic, self-glorifying, paternalistic meanings. Later on new motives has appeared reflecting social changes taking place in the USSR, especially in areas of demographic patterns and growing social mobility among non-Russian nationalities. Hegemonic motives were loaded with emotional rhetoric of "defensive" character about a "dying out" of Russian people, degradation of their traditions and culture, etc. Arguments for these powerful appeals were supplied by literary writers and social scientists; their texts composed a basis for all latter political programs and statements.

As a political movement contemporary Russian ethno-nationalism was born in the 80th when "Pamyat" organisation has started its activities mainly oriented cultural, historic preservation and ecological priorities. Its ideological context was a mixture of Orthodox monarchism, national-bolshevism and anti-Semitism. Perestroika and a crisis of the Soviet state and the Communist party rule politicised the movement, especially under a charismatic leader Dmitrii Vasiliev. In 1989-90 "Pamyat" formulated and made public its "Manifesto" which presented at that time dissident, non-official programme of hegemonic nationalism speaking on behalf of the dominant group - Russians. Here we summarise major elements of this doctrine:

a) The Russian Orthodox religion is the only possible spiritual basis for the Russians and for Russia;

b) The Tsarist monarchy is the best form of state power as carrying a sacral character;

c) No to disintegrative and weakening the state politics: "The Empire must stay be an empire and nothing wrong with it";

d) The Russians as a great nation is a triangle entity including itself three Slavic peoples - Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians;

e) Disintegration and conflicts as well as other negative phenomena are results of the mordial Zionist-masons conspiracy directed towards Russian people and their state;

f) All power in this country must belong the Russians, other groups could have only proportional representation in all institutions, including politics, culture and science(12).

After a series of internal, mainly leadership crisis, probably, partly provoked by state authorities' activities in and toward "Pamyat", the last one lost its leading place in Russian nationalism movement. This political project became much more significant and potentially profitable to be given up marginal people without proper prestige, abilities and resources. Since 1991 a whole series of Russian national movements and organisations emerged on a political arena. After the break-up of the Soviet Union there were new grounds and motives has appeared for agents of social space to articulate much stronger and in a more respectful form an appeal for Russian nationalism. This symbolic capital became a valuable commodity for trading excess to power and resources and for mobilising mass support. Why and how it happened that a nationalism on behalf of a dominant group has acquired new dimensions and strength in a situation of democratic transformations in Russia?

New geopolitical situation when about 25 million of ethnic Russians has discovered themselves in a situation of minorities(13) has brought the issue of a new Russian diaspora in a centre of political discourse. There were serious problems facing this part of the former Soviet citizens and many of these problems emerged quite unexpectedly for the architects of dis-union. Democratic leaders of Russia (Eltzin, Gaidar, Kozyrev and others) built the strategy on a wishful thinking that their allies from the former union republics in the struggle against the Centre and the Party apparatus will stay comprise a common front after emerging 15 independent polities. But it was a miscalculation: ethno-nationalism of titular groups became the only and uncompromisable choice for leaders and activists who had achieved the independence under a slogan of "national self-determination". Ethnic Russians were excluded from political process and in case of Latvia and Estonia - even from memberships of new civic communities. In several regions, like Central Asia and Transcaucasus they had discovered themselves in a turmoil of ethnic and clan clashes and in a strongly unfavourable psychological climate causing mass fears and a sizeable exodus of people.

In Russia itself the collapse of inefficient but full-employment economy as well as of not affluent but welfare state caused massive social disorientation, growing disparities in individual fortunes and a strong rhetoric of grievances and blames. These new challenges and inspirations touched most of all urban people, especially employees of military, resource and heavy industries which have predominantly ethnic Russians personnel. Conversion and elimination of outside military presence together with weakening control over a society of used to be numerous servants of repressive institutions, like KGB, produced a pool of ideologically indoctrinated, well-trained and energetic male officers with their used to a relatively comfort life spouses who actively and aggressively oppose reforms and feel a nostalgia for the "old good times". Finally, a crisis of identities took place among many citizens, especially of older generations and war veterans, who affiliated themselves with a "great Soviet power" and "great Russian people" and confronted traumatic lost of formerly enjoyed comfort status. All these factors provided a new set of arguments and emotions for social activists to recruit nationalist postulates into political debates of different levels and ranks.

On a top governmental level President Boris Eltzin and Minister of foreign affairs Andrei Kozyrev as well as the Russian parliament's leaders made one of political priorities since summer 1992 a defence of ethnic Russians in a "near abroad". Eltzin's speech at the General assembly of the United Nations in September 1994 was the most striking example of this new policy signifying a message not only for neighbouring countries and for the West but also for internal electorate meeting their inflamed concerns about the fate of compatriots. The same meaning and message was behind of presidential statements on Russia re-emerging as a great power in the world politics. That is why these very moments were especially stressed by the President in all his public appearances before a national audience after the trip to the USA. Hegemonic nationalism on a part of the President found itself in a rather explicit allying of a highest state officer with the Russian Orthodox church from the very beginning when the oath ceremony was done on the Bible and the President acknowledge his regular visits of the church while being a long-life atheist before. Another pro-nationalist stand found its manifestation in support of the Cossacks movement - a predominantly Russian nationalists activities in southern region of Russia. On June 1992 Eltzin issued a Decree legitimising the movement and its claims for exclusive defence of ethnic Russians residing autonomous republics.

But a top level, official nationalism in Russia carries mild and ambivalent forms and it is not only because of democratic orientations of Boris Eltzin and most of his team's members. It would be an extremely harmful and unrealistic political line for the country's leaders to address nationalist retraces exclusively ethnic Russians. Even comprising over 80 % of population (from that point of view, Russia is one of the most homogeneous successor states), Russians have as their compatriots about 27 millions of non-Russians and a part of them enjoy territorial autonomy and politically well-organised. Any strong linkage of the state and of its doctrines with exclusive ethnic connotation will immediately strengthen centrifugal aspirations among non-Russians. Besides, top leadership positions in Russia used to be and are now represented by politicians of different ethnic backgrounds. Among members of the Government, key figures of the former Supreme Soviet and now of the Federal Assembly, presidential advisers there are Ukrainians, Jews, Armenians, Chechens, Avars, Tuvinians, or people of mixed ethnic origins, strongly acculturated into Russian culture but meanwhile keeping their distinct identities. That is why Russian ethno-nationalism has limited possibilities for being realised on a level of official federal authorities and unavoidably transforms itself into a variant of civic nationalism or patriotism. When the President speaks of itself or called by others as a national figure or a "leader of nation" it means not any ethno-nation but all multiethnic people of Russia.

It does not exclude a situation when high-rank federal officials may profess implicitly or even openly extreme ethno-nationalism. In the Gaidar's government Michail Poltoranin, Deputy Prime-Minister and Minister of information was known by his nationalistic and anti-Semitic position. His latter protege for the ministerial post in the Chernomyrdin's cabinet Boris Mironov became scandalously known as an "iron nationalist". "In case Russian nationalism is a fascism it means that I am a Fascist", - declared Mironov(14). He was dismissed his position in September 1994 after a strong critical reaction of liberal journalists on their curator's extremist views and biased policy.

After December 1993 federal elections in the State Duma (lower chamber of the Parliament) ultra-nationalists are represented by numerous (about 40 members) faction of the Liberal-democratic (Zirinovski) party whose leader is one of the most provocative and charismatic propagandist of Russian nationalist retraces. Leaders of another influential party block (communists and agrarians) are also professing ethnic nationalism appealing "Russian people"(Russki narod"). Gennadi Zuganov, leader of the Communist Party of Russia, in his recent book "Derzhava" defines as vital interests of Russia "gathering on its land, under protection of unified and powerful statehood, all Russian people, all who consider Russia as his Motherland, all those peoples who are agree to share with Russia their historical fate"(15).

Along growing nationalist forces in the power structures there are still exist numerous periphery groups of intellectuals and activists subscribing extreme forms of Russian ethno-nationalism. Vasiliev's "Pamyat" continues to organise small-scale meetings and show-like activities blocking other extremist groups and demonstrating their young guards' black-brown uniforms at the political gatherings in Moscow. The same kind of organisation called "Russkaya partia" (Russian party) started its activities in St-Petersburg in 1992 with a platform quite similar "Pamyat" but stressing zoological anti-Semitism more then any other groups. The leader of Russian party Nikolai Bondareek stated its main priorities in the following manner: "In Russia it is the Russians who should govern... Russia must have Russian Government, Russian Parliament of ethnic Russians belonging to the Great Nation by blood and by spirit... "Everything is for the nation and nothing is against of it", - this motto must be in the brain and spirit, in the flesh and blood of every Russian, because we are all only cells of one great organism named a Nation"(16).

On February 1992 a group of Russian nationalist leaders (A.Sterligov, B.Rasputin, G.Zuganov, A.Makashov) established a new organisation "Russkii Nazional'ni Sobor"(Russian National Assembly) as an umbrella coalition of numerous groups and fractions operating all over Russia and in Ukraine, Belorussia, Baltic states, Moldova, Georgia. At the RNS' first congress there were 1500 delegates from 117 cities representing over 70 Russian patriotic organisations. RNS declares itself as "a block of patriotic parties and Russian national movements with a goal of unifying Russian and other indigenous peoples of Russia for the sake of revival of united Motherland, for defence of national-state interests, for preserving traditional moral and religious values of Russia's citizens". Its Manifesto ends with words: "We are Russians. The God is with us!" In his article "Lessons of October and opposition" published a year after October 1993 crisis in Moscow the leader of RNS Alexander Sterligov, former KGB general and former vice-president Rutzkoi's associate, analyses the clash between the President and the Supreme Soviet in words symptomatic for exlusivist and isolationist nature of Russian nationalism in spite of its reverences to "citizens of Russia". "Being under the control of non-Russian forces, The Supreme Soviet did not make an explicit choice to lean on the Russian people (Russkii narod). Parliamentary opposition has been adherent to internationalism with anti-Russian face (Khasbulatov and Rutzkoi are not considered as Russians by ultra-nationalists - VT). Oppositioners did not want to recognise that the central problem which authors and participants of Zionist plot are trying again to solve in Russia that is a Russian question. Not solving this problem, Zionist capital can not take under his control the wealth of Russia and to share Russian lands not to allow the revival of the Russian people"(17).

Meanwhile, nationalism professed by many rightist, including Communists, does not include purely ethnic message: it is more ambivalent and more often has patriotism as a key emotional argument. This kind of civic nationalism in a form of ultra-patriotic retraces became a political fashion soon after dismembering the Soviet Union and after proclaiming the Russian Federation as an independent state. On official level its strongest proponent was former vice-president Alexander Rutzkoi who has built his political fortune and failure on a "great power" propaganda and aggressive political behaviour. It was he who together with Presidential political adviser Sergei Stankevich flew by a military plane to Tiraspol (seceding territory of Moldova state) on January 1992 to make strong statements 'in situ" in defence of local Russian-speaking minority fighting Moldova's authorities. It was he who promised to send Russian aviation to bomb the city of Grozni, the capital of dissent Chechen republic.

The boundary between civic and ethnic Russian nationalisms is quite vague and both retraces are used in an ambivalent way often without recognisable distinctions. But they are two different phenomena meanwhile congruent in certain aspects. The both are Hegemonic by its nature. If Russian ethno-nationalism is pursued by dominant majority against minorities living in their country and carries exclusivist and intolerant approaches towards ethnic aliens, civic nationalism or Russian patriotism demonstrates its hegemonism towards any forces and groups considered as external or internal "enemies" and subversing the greatness and integrity of the country. But at the same time carries a strong drive towards an inclusive nation-building and encourages policies of fusion and integration. Its main thrust, at least on a declarative level (but everything in politics is declarative), is toward equality of all citizens. That is why it may be categorised also as citizen nationalism. Its difference from pure ethno-nationalism may be only relative because it contains a tendency against pluralism which may lead to a denial of separate identity by minority groups. That is why in Hegemonic civic nationalism, being probably more appropriate formula for a nation-building project, is not welcomed and treated with suspicions by non-Russians seeing behind this project a camouflage form for the same Russian chauvinism or a modernised version of the "Soviet people" doctrine. Their fears are well understood because always in the past Rossia and Rossians (more accurate transliteration of the Country's name and widely accepted identity word for all citizens) were synonymy words Rus and Russkie (a name of the early state and of ethnic Russians). In Latin alphabet it is still used only one word for defining ethnic Russians and Rossians as citizens of a state. Then, even in its mild and non-discriminative form civic nation-building is always more promising project for dominant (demographically, culturally and politically) group then for minorities groups subjected native culture's losses. In Russia any politics of cultural pluralism will unavoidably contain so called "core" or referent culture that is Russian culture and language. That is why non-Russian elites of territorial autonomies formulate their own response in the same programmatic context of nationalism. This response presents a serious challenge for building multiethnic civic society in Russia.

Defensive or titular nationalism.

Like Vasiliev and Zirinovski made Russian nationalism a front-page theme especially for the Western media, the topic of periphery nationalism in Russia became widely known and discussed because of a separatist stand followed by few autonomous republics right after the Russian Federation has "seceded" out of the Soviet Union. Before August 1991 separatism on a part of titular nationalities in the former union republics was a major challenge for the Gorbachev's perestroika which ended with a triumph of disintegration. Non-Russian nationalisms were and still are the most flourishing ideological doctrine and political practice of the post-Soviet space. Their roots are in Soviet legacies in spite of the fact that among some nationalities elite elements formulated an idea of a nation under the tsarist empire and nationalist political movements has been taking place before 1917(18). It was during the Soviet period when immense political efforts, material and intellectual resources were invested to implement a propaganda thesis about prosperous "socialist nations" and to realise a constitutional declaration on limited self-determination offered by the Bolsheviks when they had been fighting for power against their political opponents.

A key element in constructing Soviet nations was the etatization of ethnicity shaped around short-lived independent states, like Transcaucasus republics in 1918-21 and Baltic states in 1918-1940, and numerous administrative autonomies mushroomed during the first two decades after the Revolution of 1917. It was a period of Soviet history when a process of moulding nations around state formations is taking place. "Though in popular understanding and in nationalist' ideologies the nation is usually thought to exist prior to the state and to be the basis on which the states has been formed, historians have long recognised the importance of states in the creation of nations', writes Ronald Suny in his study of Soviet nationalism(19). At the time of dismembering the Soviet Union consisted of 53 ethno-territorial formations of different hierarchical levels, but all were qualified as a state form of national self-determination for those ethnic groups on behalf of which republics or autonomous oblast and autonomous okrug were declared. For seventy years these titular nationalities were developing a deep belief that only through their "own" state they can exist as a distinct people (ethnos) and that the only legitimate states are those based on ethnic principles. Republican state institutions were considered in political discourse and in public consent as a property of "native nations".

That is why titular nationalism arose among "state" nationalities first and only after it caused a response from stateless communities to fight for their "own" states also to share what had looked as a "natural" state of things. Following the Soviet academic language and political doctrine, leaders of major non-Russian nationalities has declared newly emerged states as a form of realisation national self-determination meaning under this formula titular ethno-nations, that are ethnic Estonians, Latvians, Kazakhs, Moldavians, Georgians, etc. but not all people living these territories and very often comprising sizeable portion of populations (from over 50% in Kazakhstan to 23% in Lithuania). It was only in the Russian Federation's Declaration of sovereignty the last one was proclaimed on behalf of "multinational people of Russia".

In the former Soviet Union nationalism of titular non-Russian nationalities could be considered as a defensive form of political behaviour on a part of minorities groups because relations between the centre and the ethnic peripheries remained basically imperial. All major decisions, from economic strategy to key power positions' appointments, were done in Moscow which was associated with ethnic Russians or at least with acculturated into Russian culture bureaucratic and party elites. "Non-Russian republics were treated as objects of central policy rather than as subjects capable of independent decision-making, and their national destinies were fundamentally altered as a result... A fundamental contradiction between empire and emerging nations grew like a cancer within the Soviet state. Much more than the tsarist empire, the USSR had become a "prisonhouse of nations" - indeed, of nations that had grown up within the Soviet Union"(20). But what is lacking this observation of Ronald Suny that is from the very beginning defensive nationalism of non-Russian peripheries was carrying growing elements of intolerance and of exclusiveness addressed internal minorities and even representatives of dominant group - the Russians. In the former Soviet Union republics were a domain of titular nationalism depriving what I call "double minorities" the same rights of free expressions and of decision-making.

With a demise of the imperial state this external defensive function of titular nationalism has vanished, meanwhile it did not change but even strengthen its internal ethno-centric character. After acquiring a full control of new independent polities ethnic elites started to behave in a Hegemonic way towards those who happened to live not on territories of their "own" states. The goal of radical nationalists became to make "normal" national states, culturally and even demographically more homogeneous, excluding "non-natives" from access to resources and power and even from citizenship. A policy, like "Georgia is for the Georgians!" formulated by the president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, has caused major ethnic clashes and internal wars spreading all over the post-Soviet space. Armenians expelled Azeris and Azeris expelled Armenians minorities in their republics, Uzbeks expelled Meskhetian Turks and Georgians refuse to return Turks back to Georgia where they were deported from during Stalin's repression. Georgian nationalist government abolished Southern Ossetia autonomy causing three-years opened conflict still not resolved.

Being trapped by Soviet nationalism's legacies new leaderships of successor states had found themselves unprepared to change ethnonationalist doctrine in favour of civic nation-building projects. Enforcement of citizenship and official language laws in societies with sizeable and culturally distinct minorities and with a wide spread of Russian language even among considerable part of titular nationalities has caused a massive discontent and interethnic tensions in countries like Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine and others. Former "double minorities" formulated claims for their "own" national states or started irredentism movements preferring to exit political systems where they could not see perspectives for proper voice and representation. Armenian enclave in Nagorni Karabakh has started initiated in Armenia a fight for reunification with "historic motherland". Abkhazian leaders responded Georgian hegemonism with ferocious struggle to separate from Georgia ended at the moment the expulsion of ethnic Georgians from Abkhazia. Russian-Ukrainian minority in eastern Moldova proclaimed their own state in Tridniestria region and Gagauz minority demand territorial autonomy in the limits of Moldova. Russian majority in Crimea want to be a part of Russia not of Ukraine and Crimean Tatars minority are dreaming of making Crimea their own national state. This list of mutual dissatisfactions and claims can go on and on and there are many more potential clients for conflict generating projects.

The fundamental reason for this lays in unrealisable utopia of ethnonationalism to implement a principle "one ethnic group - one state" cherished for decades by Soviet academic theory and propaganda. In spite of democratic achievements in a cause of radical transformations partly initiated and contributed by nationalist movements, at least at a stage of crushing the Communist Party's rule and unitary state structures, titular ethnonationalism is transforming itself into a major obstacle for building peaceful civic societies on a territory of the former Soviet Union. The Russia Federation which inherited all ambivalencies and contradictions of previous ethnic politics even more then other successor states, faces this challenge being not in a front-line of a historic race for new nation-buildings. Being a large multiethnic entity, very much like the USSR, Russia is still a country where defensive titular nationalism is not exhausted its constructive potentials for distracting highly centralised state structures and for dismantling political and cultural realm dominated by one ethnic component. And at the same time non-Russian nationalism is demonstrating its limitations and incompatible nature with the cause of reforms and democratisation. What kind of manifestations is it taking place?

Periphery as well as Hegemonic nationalist discourse tends to idealise the past of the people on behalf it speaks out. This past is usually presented as a series of glorious events and great cultural achievements or as a history of sufferings and injustices committed toward the people by the others (so called "outside groups"). Such phenomena like colonisation, territorial expansion of states, wars, cultural interactions in forms of assimilation or integration are interpreted by ethnic entrepreneurs as malicious acts of one people ("colonisers", "conquerors", "oppressors") toward another people. In Russia it is the Russians who are presented in that kind of role in spite of the fact that representatives of other, especially large nationalities(Tatars, Ukrainians, Armenians, etc.) participated territorial and economic colonisation and played culturtreger roles. For example, Tatars were major agents of Sovietization and of cultural modernisation for Islamic population of Central Asia in the 20th century. For much longer period Tatars were playing assimilationist role for other ethnic groups in Volga region and Siberia, like Chuvash, Bashkirs and small indigenous groups.

Anti-Russian sentiments and arguments are the most wide-spread motive for periphery nationalists trying to reconsider and to reconcile the past for nowadays political purposes. We can cite only a couple of examples from numerous texts produced by local intellectuals. As Ulyana Vinokurova, a professional sociologist and a member of the Legislative assembly of Yakutia, writes, "the cultural space of Yakutia represents a lovely nurtured field of the Yakut culture an abandoned and unrequested field of the Russian culture... Probably, in these diametrically opposite cultural orientations of the peoples co-existing for three centuries are manifested the differences in life values of representatives of these ethnoses"(21). Another author, representing a "stateless" minority of Shorts (Altaic group of 16 thousand people in Southern Siberia), formulates a nationalist Manifesto in a more explicit and provocative form: "A time has came for Great Russians to concentrate themselves on their historical motherland called "Central non-black soil lands"! The conquered lands should be returned to their indigenous owners, with whom they can establish equal relations... We must take all efforts to form a united state in Altai and Sayani under one title, what unfortunately could not be able to realise our predecessors"(22).

For the recent years periphery, defensive nationalism has transformed itself from cultural, revitalistic forms into elaborated and well-organised political movements bringing its advocates and representatives to power positions in practically all ethnic autonomies of the Russian Federation. But the irony of the situation that radical nationalists has played a kind of prescriptive mission to bring or to keep in power the same cadres of the former party nomenclatures who skilfully changed their ideological preaches in favour of nationalist doctrine and used its activists as a counterbalance in a hard bagairning with a Centre for the control of local populace and resources. The most striking example is the Republic of Tatarstan where Tatar ethnonationalism expressed in a radical form by a number of ultra-nationalist organisations and by local intellectuals was used by the ruling elite to establish a firm and indisputable political order based on titular representation. About 85% of all appointments on key positions at republican and local levels went to ethnic Tatars comprising no more then half of the population. Using a powerful slogan of national sovereignty and self-determination the Tatarstan's authorities took a resolute stand for defining the republic as a fully independent state and as "a subject of international law". The last formula, unclear and provocative, and at the same time appealing and promising for activists, was used effectively together with other appealing slogans ("democratic and sovereign state", "equal partnerships with Russia”, etc.) to ignore federal Constitution and authorities and to organise a referendum on the 21st of March 1992 on the question "Do you want the Tatarstan republic to be a democratic and a sovereign state building its relations with Russia on a partnership basis?" accompanied by official statements that this referendum formula does not mean any secession from Russia at all. Well-manipulated by local administrators and by mass media used to be loyal electorate marginally (51%) voted for "yes" in this referendum and the results were immediately proclaimed as an expression of "the people's will" to be an independent state. As a realisation of this "will" a new Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan was passed by the Supreme Soviet in November 1992 and its 61 article defines the republic as a sovereign state associated with the Russian Federation.

Strong political language in a framework of ethnonationalist discourse is quite often a weapon of the weak to become stronger. In case of Tatarstan followed by other republics of Russia a challenge of regional leaders to the Centre looked much more impressive and legitimate when it was framed into the local nations' demands. The federal power confronting political nationalism's challenge had to restrain its behaviour and negotiate the issues in a more responsible way then with cases of trivial regional separatism, like it took place with the self-proclaimed the Urals republic on a basis of Sverdlovsk administrative region when the President Eltzin addressed a simple solution dismissing the local governor from his position. Two years of intensive negotiating resulted in signing a Treaty between Tatarstan and the Russian Federation in February 1994 which has provided more responsibilities and rights for the republic and also has demonstrated symbolically a possibility of peaceful solution even for most radical nationalist scenarios arising in a bosom of a single state. By signing this treaty with Moscow authorities the Tatarstan government has reached at least two goals: it strengthen his position and legitimacy in the republic, it eased potentially dangerous tensions between three major groups of the local population and it minimised the political vocality and role of the extremist elements among Tatar nationalists. Moderate official ethnonationalism has proved to be a useful negotiating tool for the top-level politics. It became an appealing message for other ethno-territorial elites how to behave themselves on a federal political arena. That is why republican leaders were and still are strongly oppose any attempts to grant equal status for all units("subjects") of Federation, including territorial administrative regions, or to deprive the republics of their Constitutional definition as "national states". They see in these moves a danger of loosing a special status based not on economic or demographic resources but on ethnic factor viewed in a post-Soviet societies as a primordial one for legitimate claim for political power.

But not all periphery ethnonationalists in Russia are choosing negotiating strategy to reach their goals. Another separatist leaders, in the Chechen republic of the Northern Caucasus, has opted cout-d'etat style of political behaviour since the fall 1991 when the former Soviet general Dudayev has proclaimed this republic a state independent of Russia. It was and still the only case when nationalism manifests itself in a militant form proving literally one of its definition that "nationalism is ethnicity plus an army". Seizing army arsenals in this republic and supplying arms for civic population, local leaders created extremely dangerous situation for any outside interference and unstable internal disorder. Over one hundred thousand of ethnic Russians has left the republic causing great damages for the local economy. The oil production has fell under control of criminal structures and local clans started to rival for dividends and for prestigious positions. Armed groups refused to obey decrees and orders issued by the President Dudayev and as a result the civic life in this republic was completely disorganised bringing economic and social sufferings for the people. In September 1994 the opposition forces declared a war on the Dudayev's regime and the federal authorities provided their support for this opposition making a large-scale civil clashes a sad reality of contemporary Russia.

Chechen militant nationalism has also sent a strong message for its potential proponents. Its unrealisable and irresponsible strategy brought a "sobering up" effect for other regions of the country where ethnonationalism is still strong. Ethnic leaders in Russia are becoming more interested in development programmes avoiding conflict generating confrontations. It is too early to speak about any decisive step aside of ethnonationalism in Russia but it is possible to note that after a certain experience nationalism can transform itself into more positive direction seeking to expand the realm of protection in which individuals and groups are shielded from the brutalities and oppression of others, as well as to expand individuals' capacities to experience autonomy and self-fulfilment. That kind of nonexclusivist variants of nationalism are capable of recognising the value of not only their own, but also of other's cultures, and of supporting political regimes that safeguard them. There are prospects for that kind of nationalism in Russia and if it happens in future we may give it another label.

References:

1. Dubravka Ugresic, "Parrots and Priests: "before" and "after" in Yugoslavia", Times Literary Supplement, 15 May 1992, p.12

2. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Post Communist Nationalism", Foreign Affairs, vol.68, no.5 (Winter, 1989-90):2.

3. William Pfaff, The Wrath of Nations. Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993.

4. Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Enziklopedia, vol.17. Moscow: Soviet Encyclopedia publishing house, 1974, p.375.

5. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983, p.1.

6. Ronald Suny, Nationalism and Ethnic Unrest in the Soviet Union. - World Policy Journal, Summer 1989, p. 528.

7. See: Yulian Bromley, Ocherki teorii etnosa (Essays on a theory of ethnos). Moscow: "Nauka", 1983.

8. Liah Greenfeld,  Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 11.

9. Brzezinski, Op.cit., p.2.

10. Asbjorn Eide, In Search of constructive alternatives to secession. Paper prepared for the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 1993, p.5.

11. According all-Russian census of 1987 intellectuals, including government and education people, comprised 2,7% of the country's population, which was predominantly illiterate.

12. Russkoie delo segodnya (Russian Cause Today). Book 1. "Pamyat". Comp. by Erunov I. and V.Solovei. Moscow: Institute of ethnology and anthropology, 1991.

13. See: Valery Tishkov. Russians as a minority: the Estonian case. Working papers in urgent and applied ethnology, N52. Institute of ethnology and anthropology, Moscow, 1993; Valery Tishkov. Russians in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Working papers in urgent and applied ethnology, N51. Institute of ethnology and anthropology, Moscow, 1993

14. Moskovskie novosti (Moscow News), 28 August-4 September 1994, p.11.

15 Zuganov G. Derzhava. 2nd enlarged edition. Moscow: Informpechat, 1994, p.77

16 "Rech", Gazeta of Russian Party, 1993, n1, p.4

17. "Russkii Sobor", 1994, n10, p.2

18. See, f.e.: Suny R. The making of the Georgian Nation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.1991; Rorlich A. The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilence.

19. Suny R. The Revenge of the Past. Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993, p.97

20. Ibid., p.112-113

21. Ulyana Vinokurova, Skaz o narode Sakha (A Tale about the people of Sakha). Yakutsk: Bichik, 1994, p.59.

22. Kashkachakov A.P. Shoriyu - Shortzam!..(Shoria - to the Shorts!..). - Zemlya Sibirskaya, Dal'nevostochnaya, 1992, n.11-12, p.14.