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WHAT IS RUSSIA? PERSPECTIVES FOR NATION-BUILDING

The Context of Debate    

After the demise of the Soviet Union under a slogan of national self-determination, Russia (as well as  other successor states) will remain a multiethnic country with complex historical and cultural legacies and with a challenging and uncertain agenda for a future. Besides economic and political transformations, the most serious challenge is the problem of governing a multiethnic society in a framework of one state. Even established democracies do not have often good records on this home task, not speaking of less modernized and not so well-being countries. Here we formulate a question: is Russia a legitimate state after being accept into the United Nations? And could it be considered a nation-state as the rest of the UN members?  The question is not so simple and the answer is not obvious because the very possibility of the nation-building project for Russia is considered as "mission impossible" by a number of experts and policy-makers from many strands. Zbigniew Brzezinski putting it in a way: "Is Russia primarily a nation-state or is it a multi-national empire?" called for a firm creation of "a felicitous environment for Russia to define itself purely as Russia" and expressed a sentiment: "in not being an empire, Russia stands a chance of becoming, like France and Britain or earlier post-Ottoman Turkey, a normal state"1

Another outside observer, "in defence of liberal nationalism" listed the Russian federation among states, like India, Pakistan, South Africa, Iraq which could be ripped apart by the wave of disintegrative nationalism the next few decades2. The same kind of question "What is Russia?" is asked by many social actors in the country itself. The ethnic Russian nationalists and "empire-savers" resist to recognise new geopolitical reality and want to restore the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire which "were built by the brain, labor and blood of generations of Russian people"3. Those among non-Russian nationalists following the separatist scenario elaborate an ideology and impose political slogans like "Tatarstan is not Russia" or "Moscow should define what is Russia first and then to start negotiating with those who has already defined its sovereign statehood4

Among cited doubts of Russia's legitimacy are distinctive ethnic ingredients of its population and demands on a number of non-Russian nationalities to establish their own states. But even those who stand for Russia after its December 1991 configuration express a great variety of confusing and vague ideas on the future of the state. It equally concerns academic discourse and political domain as well. Being for the recent years as one the contributors to this academic and political search for a formula for a new Russia, the author came to the conclusion that the major obstacle for Russia to become a "normal" state is not an ethnic mosaic per se but a real "fire in a brain" seeded by elitist social engineers into mentality and language concerning ethnicity and nationality issues. This inflamed and imagined picture quite often has nothing to do with reality. To read and to deconstruct it in a peaceful and cooperative manner is probably not an easier task then to build a market economy or a democratic system of governance.

Legacies of the Past

States are made first of all by territories and by citizenship as well as by legal-constitutional basis. But when one have a situation of newly emerged or radically transforming states it is no less important a role of what Ian Lustick called a "hegemonic idea of a state", especially concerning its territorial and civic entities5. Only shared values, symbols and mutually accepted legal order can provide bottom up (grass-root) legitimization and make a state viable. Top-level agreements, upper power declarations and international recognition are far not enough to construct a co-citizenship, that is a nation-state, even if it is listed among members of the United Nations. All post-Soviet states are now on a way to "nation-building" with different degree of success and failures. Russia is not in a front-line of this historical race. There are few reasons for this besides a lack of political wisdom and will.

First, it is the Russian Federation inherited most of all ambivalences of nation-building efforts from the previous regimes. In pre-revolutionary Russia it were a Tsarist monarchy and the Orthodox religion major institutions legitimizing the state, which was defined consistently as the personal domain of the tsar. A process of introducing civic nationalism formula into a public discourse under the concept of "fatherland" (otechestvo) and "people" (narod) was started in the 18th century, in times of two monarchs Peter I and Catherine II. Many outstanding cultural figures (historian Karamzin, scholar and writer Lomonosov and poet Pushkin) were among the first intellectuals trying to instill in the Russian society the idea of the nation in its Western (or the French revolution) meaning. These elitist efforts has finally evolved into late XIXth century liberal debates about a "Rossian" or "Russsian" nation considered by most influential thinkers, like Pyotr Struve, as "all people who participate in the culture". Two words "Russian" and "Rossian" (russkaya and rossiiskaya) were used most often as synonyms and did no carry strong ethnic or cultural connotations. It was motivated by the very fact that in the Russian Empire ethnic boundaries were loose and ethnic group identities, including ethnic Russians, were non-exclusive and carried a multiplied character. These identities were overpowered by other forms of loyalties based on religion, regional characteristic, dynastic and clans affiliations, landlords fidelities, etc. But to a certain extent the orthographic "mixture" has reflected a dominant status of Russian language and culture in spite of the nobility itself and intellectuals were often not of ethnic Russian stock. This implicit projection for defining all Russia's population was sensitively read and resented by growing nationalism among periphery elites, which has started formulate its alternative nation-building projects, like Finns, Poles, Georgians or  Tatars. So, before the Bolshevicks revolution a process of Russian nation building was on a way but could not be considered as accomplished as it was not accomplished in the rest part of the World6. Liah Greenfeld concluded her study of this process in Russia with following remarks: "Moved by the restless spirit born out of the agony of its elite, Russia would never give in to despair completely. It would never give up hope to become the superior Western state, to fulfill the promise of France, to be the truly new New World"7.

The nation-building process in imperial Russia was abrupt by the Bolsheviks' regime and the whole vocabulary was changed in favour of Austrian-Marxist and east-European social-democrats' political and academic language defining nations as ethno-nations or as a "highest type of ethnos". The "socialist nations" had been proclaimed by and purposefully constructed in the Soviet Union on a basis of existing or invented cultural differences. Soviet ideology and political practice pursuing declarative internationalism were enforcing at the same time mutually exclusive ethnic loyalties through a system of official registration of "nationality" on blood principle and through territorialization of ethnicity on a principle of "socialist"(read: ethnic - VT) federalism. In this situation  the very process of civic nation-building has lost its sense and it was substituted by a clumsy category and by a slogan of "making the Soviet people". The last one was defined by Soviet theoreticians and propagandists as a "new historical entity of people of metha-ethnic character"8.

Recent deep transformations has finished with the state and suppossely with its doctrines. The radical democrats in the Centre and "periphery" ethno-nationalists has initiated strong repudiations of the "Soviet people" project as a part of the Communist legacies. But ironically it is getting more and more clear that in many respects the Soviet regime has succeded in constructing such a phenomenon as a "new entity" with a certain "hegemonic idea". After the demise of the Soviet Union it manifests itself not only in highly interdependent economy and in still carefully guarded external borders but also in powerful cultural symbols and values, in extensive human and professional links on individual and collective levels, even in behavioral patterns and perceptions of the outside world. Empire demonstrates itself as a system of elites communications with strong vested interests, as a symbolic capital extremely difficult to divide and to be vanished.

Thus, it will take a certain historical time for this capital to be devaluated or may be partly transformed and kept as, for example, concerning such a powerful mean of modernization and communication in the post-Soviet space as Russian language. For the world community, Western strategists and new post-Soviet leaders it should be clear that imperial legacies could not be abolished by decrees, it should be substituted by new loyalties, symbols and values. These symbolic feelings and institutions are a part of societal culture and important legitimizing element for power in its broad understanding as an ability to define a social space of others. How in this context we see the situation in Russia now?

The Essence of Ethnic Challenge

Striking manifestations of ethnic factor in the post-Soviet public domain are not only a reaction on repressions and discrimination suffered by members of non-dominant groups. It is also a result of purposeful efforts on a part of the Communist state in constructing prestigious institutions of internal ethno-national statehoods and in extensive training ethnic elites. The last ones are acquiring now an access to resources and control cultural and political domains in their "own" republics. Now practically in all 20 ethno-national autonomies of the Russian federation, besides Karelian, Khakass and Komi republics, political power is under an assured control of local nationals even when their group does not comprise a majority of a republics' population but enjoy a status of a titular nationality. While the centre was and is still dominated by  representatives of ethnic Russians (82% of the population) and by those who were integrated into the "core" culture. Even representative bodies, like elected in December 1993 the State Duma(lower Chamber of the Parliament) lack proper representation of regional unclaves of non-Russian nationalities. It is embarassly dominated by the "Garden Circle"(downtown part of Moscow) politicians (173 from 450 deputies are the Moscovites). Not speaking of executive governmental structures and other prestigious positions in the Centre, like high-rank army officers, diplomatic servants, media barons, etc., which has never been a subject of purposeful redistribution.

Local nationals (those part of non-Russians residing their "own" territorial autonomies) being not "voiced" in a central system and being unable to challenge a power control of the Centre are leading now a ferocious political fight for devollution of power in their own favour, especially for the purpose of control over transferring former state properties into private possessions. Power and economic resources are two major propertities which the Centre does not want to give away and which regional elites, including in ethnic republics, are desperately aspiring. Regional/titular ethno-nationalism and group loyalties are playing now an important role of political mobilization and of a tool in negotiating with the Centre and in providing titular nationals an exclusive status in republics. In this struggle titular elites are opting for different scenarias, including extreme ones, like "exit" from a system in form of seccession or like harsh repressions towards local "double" minorities.

At this historical moment Russia is not falling apart but it faces a serious challenge of unmanageable ethnicity. There are already painful realities like ethnic political coalitions on regional level and a split of electorate along ethnic lines.  Ethnic intolerance, xenophobia and violent manifestations in forms of territorial cleansing and communal clashes are taking place not only in republics but in other areas, including large cities. Secessionist formula displays itself in a coup-d-etat style regime of general Dudaev in Chechen republic and in a milder form - in Tatarstan. In November 1992 the Northern Ossetia leadership with the Federal authorities involvement has executed classical cleansing of the Ingush minority resulted over 300 killed and about 40 thousand expelled people. There are few other perspective clients for extreme scenarias and there are several areas of growing tensions and of possible unrest. Periodic political appeasements like signing the Federal Treaty in the Kremlin on March 1992 or adopting new Constitution in December 1993 followed by a treaty between Tatarstan and federal authorities look quite vulnerable and could be easily challenged by new unexpected rebels.

In spite of a sobering effect of unrealized secessionist projects in the territory of the FSU (Nagorni Karabakh, Triednestria, Abkhazia), and in spite of existing horrors in the ex-Yugoslavia, "when under the slogan of democratization the governments of all the republics have made their lands unmistakably poorer and their people unhappier"9, there are enthusiastic ethnic entrepreneurs in Russia who ready to follow this scenario. Different arguments ("destiny", "historical justice", "people will", "international law") and different resources (inflamed propaganda, demonstrations, political manipulations, mass media,cultural  institutions, paramilitary activities) are used to achieved aspired goals. It deserves mentioning that not only domestic legacies and realities but the inertia of the Cold War warriors  provide these entrepreneurs explicit arguments and implicit support. Otherwise, there were no need for a strong comment done recently by Dimitri Simes: "Stability is important for a nation with thousands of nuclear weapons and continuing territorial tensions with its newly independent neighbours. Too much disunity in Russia (as appealing as it is to those who "love" that country so much that they would prefer to see several Russia) increases the likelihood of a civil war that could easily engulf most, if not all, of the post-Soviet states, creating not only nuclear and environmental disasters but a grave threat to world peace as well"10

Taking into consideration this wider political background we recommend more sensitive and profound interpretation of the post-Soviet ethnicity. It goes further trivial "empire eclate" model subscibed by many experts explaining what had happened and what is going on this part of the World. It should be understood and recognised, including by policy-makers and strategists, that to a large extent the cauldron of ethnicity covers under his rhetoric about "a historical imperative of self-determination" many different roles and functions. Among these roles are: a) a therapy from a giant trauma and a mean of regaining collective and individual worth; b) an accessible and understandable basis for mass mobilization in a situation of collapsing centralized state and of its ideology; c) a tool of getting prestige, power and resources in a process of redistributing previously alienated material and symbolic properties.

Poorly understood ethnic phenomenon may lead to a "rising" (in Mikhail Bakhtin's term) of grass-root myths and dogmas on a level of official language and behaviour. It makes in-depth analysis and responsible recommendations even more difficult. Understanding ethnicity as a social construct and as a negotiating tool bring greater capacity "to mediate politically and socioculturally modify social relations within and among ethnic groups by creative symbolic action than is acknowleged by those who conceive ethnicity either in naturalistic terms, regarding "ethnos" like "eros" and "thanatos" as a deep structural dimension of consciousness, or in essentialist terms as a component of personal identity so rooted in past historical memory that little can be done by human agency in the present to shape its character or temper the antagonistic posture of ethnic groups toward ethnic otherness and difference"11. What kind of "creative symbolic action" could be suggested to meet an ethnic challenge for Russia?        

Approaching a new state doctrine

A quest for a new concept of nationality policy and more large - for a formula of new Russia was in agenda of political and academic discourse since it became clear that major Gorbachev's fallacy was a nationality policy and that Eltzin can easily share the same route. But results of these debates and of political improvising were basically disheartening. The author of the article has also contributed the search for a new Russia. Few years ago we had started to write about unrealistic doctrine and dead-end strategy of ethno-nationalism when it stopped to be a part of Communist ideology and totalitarian party rule12. At the same time it was rather evident that any ettempts to dismantle these politically and emotionally legitimized realities from the above would be another case of irresponsible social engineering. That is why it Looks more promising a formula of building a multicultural nation based on a double and mutually nonexclusive loyalties (cultural/ethnic and state/civic) of  citizens of a state. This formula includes a strategy of gradual de-ethnicization of the state and of de-etatization of ethnicity without questioning the existing institute of ethno-territorial autonomies. This formula puts as a basic principle of policy toward Russian nationalities a respect and support of individual rigths and interests based ones' affilliation to a certain culture or an ethnic group. But these individual rights as a basis of democracy are not enough for governing multiethnic Russia and additional mechanisms for defining and providing collective rights, especially those of indigenous minorities should be implemented into a structure and a doctrine of the state. Russia is not a "national state" of ethnic Russians as well as any constituent part of it is not an exclusive property of any nationality group. This formula gives a chance for Russia to move toward a civic society and a democratic state where human rigths are respected and the cultural mosaic is preserved.

In its initial form this new doctrine was suggested in a position paper "On the concept of nationality policy in the Russian Federation" at the federal Cabinet's meeting on July 30, 1992 presided by Boris Eltzin. That discussion behind the Kremlin walls was a remarkable event because for the first time the Russian reformers had to talk not about economy or social issues but about what was not in their priority agenda before. The position paper was not rejected and was not approved formally. The Presedent and members of the Government were ill-prepared to discuss the issue in suggested terms and formulas like co-citizeship, civic identity, cultural pluralism, consociational democracy. Even the meeting itself was closed for the press and the document was not made public.

Nevertheless, July 1992 was an important point in re-evaluating nationality issues on a top political level. It had influenced later on the text of the new Constitution approved in December 1993. It extends and gurrantee integrity and rights of Russia's republics but at same time it does not define republics as "national" states(just states!). It was first serious step to challenge assigned privileged status of titular groups in republics.  There were no serious arguments against but there was a hidden resentment on a part of republican leaders to depart the word "national" from the Constitution. It was the buseness-oriented President of Kalmykia Kirsan Ilumzhinov only who openly supported this position. A hard bargaining for taking more power from the centre and a certain degree of political realism helped to make this step aside of ethno-nationalism. It discloses a new political tendancy of weakening desintegrationist forces and projects, especially after all top leaders of republics and of administrative regions (oblast and krai) took under control the high chamber of the federal Parliament - the Council of Federation. Meanwhile, the very fact that the Constitution was not approved by majority of republics during a referendum is still one of a weak point in its legitimate power.

The real breakthrough took place  when in February 1994 the President Eltzin sent his first Address to the newly elected Federal Assembly. For the first time in Soviet and post-Soviet history, the leader of Russia has publicly admitted that the cause of ethnic strife may lie in the structure of the state - in the inherent contradiction between the principles of "national statehood" (when political-administrative units have been created on ethnic factor) and that of territorial federalism. Not avoiding ambivalences in its own political language, President Eltzin nevertheless stated: "A multitude of national (surely read: "ethnic" - VT) problems have been engendered by the contradictory nature of two principles which, from the very beginning, were established as the basis of the state structure of the Russian Federation: the ethno-territorial principle and the administrative-territorial principle. This becomes clear today as a redistribution of functions and powers is taking place between the federal government and subjects of the Federation. Under present conditions, a historical necessity for both principles to coexist persists. At the same the contradiction between them will diminish on the basis of a new notion of the nation as co-citizenship, which is enshrined in the Constitution"13. For the first time, the Russian leader has declared that the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, as well as that of its constituent parts, is invested in the entirety of its multiethnic population, not in ethnic groups: "No single ethnic group can possess an exclusive right to control over territory, political institutions and resources. Equility of rights is conditioned by the necessity to take mutually-agreed decisions, taking into account the interests of various ethnic groups".                          

This statement is in a promising direction but need to be elaborated and implemented into complex context of competing and powerful approaches subscribed by different political forces.   Probably, it is the best starting point and an appropriate political moment to define what does it mean for Russia to be a nation state. The most important innovation in political symbolism could be a national idea of "Rossia" (it is a precise transliteration of the name of the country into latin alphabet) as a national state of "Rossians" ( rossiyane is a widely used word different from the word "russkie" defining ethnic Russians) as citizens of the state. The idea of Rossian nation is not loaded with ethnic meaning as it is with Russian (russkaya) nation. Similar definitions exist for British, Indian, Spanish, American, Chinese, Canadian, Malaysian and many other multiethnic nations.

From historical, political and cultural aspects there are enough grounds for this creative symbolic action. First, the Russian Federation is a member of the UN with other nation states and in Russia(or better - Rossia) itself it had been a long tradition in political and everyday language to use the term "nation" in its international meaning. But it never was properly legitimise because contradicted official doctrine of ethnic nationalism. Words, like "national ahem, court of arms,interests, army, health, security," or "Eltzin is a leader of nation", "Kremlin is a symbol of nation" and many other are in a permanent public discourse without causing public resistance. Second, Rossia in its new borders is a historical phenomenon and not a paradox and a result of irresponsible political improvisation. It has more or less widely perceived geographical image and real territorial holity. Its economic, communication and administrative infrastructures were set and developed for 70 years when it existed as a part of the Soviet Union. even in the Tsarist empire it had its own administrative configurations bordering other regions of the country, like MaloRossia(Ukraine) or Turkestan(Central Asia). Third, there is exist a great degree of cultural cohesion and of a sense of common identity among the population. Just one example: with its 150 million people of different ethnic backgrounds (about a hundred ethnic groups counting minorities from other successor states) Rossia is one of a few such a large country where all people can speak one language (in the Soviet Union there were about twenty million people who could not speak Russian). From that point it is more culturally homogeneous then many other large and small states considered to be nation states. Fourth, in spite of all rhetoric the country's identity and loyalty is not a miracle but a reality. The feeling of being "Rossian" is equally strong among large groups like ethnic Russians and among relatively small groups, like Yakuts or Buryats in Siberia, not speaking of "non-status", dispersed nationalities, like Ukrainians, Jews, Germans, etc. We has done in November 1993 a sociological survey in all republics of Rossia measuring civic identity and its correlations with other identities. The results even in republics with explicit political stand to differentiate itself from Rossia, like Tatarstan, were striking. Of all population, only 24.4% defined themselves as "only tatarstanis", 12.8% - "more tatarstanis then rossianis", 35.8% - "equally tatarstanis and rossianis, 12.3% - "more rossianis then tatarstanis", 10.4% - "only rossianis" and 4.3% could not be able to give an answer. In other republics of the country a level of multiple loyalty is even higher and a Rossian identity is stronger. By our estimations the most strong pan-Russian (or Rossian) identity exist among non-Russians not living on the territories of their "own" states. This part of population comprise about 18 from 27 millions of non-Russians and they live all over the country. For example, for about 200 thousand Tatars living in Moscow for several centuries it is extremely difficult to identify themself with a Tatar nation self-determinig on the territory of the Tatar republic and it is impossible to associate with any other ethno-nation because they preserve distinct cultural characteristics, including often language. It is a serious measuring and observation to be ignored by experts and policy-makers. What are the major obstacles for civic nation-building in Rossia and how do we estimate a possibility of this option?

Doctrineurs and nationalists in the Centre

The most resolute opponent of the idea is inherited dogmatic mentality introduced through a long-cherished pseudo-theory of a national question. This theory as an integral part of Marxist-Leninist doctrine for the time being had produced its own political reality as well as hundreds of pseudo-academic practitioners many of whom still occupy influential positions in the establishment and do not want to surrender old idols and preaches. Not by accident, the first negative reaction on the above mentioned Eltzin's address was expressed publicly by Eduard Bagramov, who used to be a leading Communist party expert on the nationality question and now helds a position of the head of the Department in the Ministry of Federation and Nationalities Affairs: "So far it concerns an interpretation of basic theoretic and political categories in the most important official documents there is an obvious need to discuss this question in order to correct the text of the Presidential address when it formulates a thesis about nation"14. Arguments used against the new state doctrine are the following. First, It would be the Russians among the first who do not accept the notion of Rossian nation because "every Russian identifies itself as a representative of a great nation but not of an ethnic or tribal group", repeats Bagramov routine nationalistic rhetoric.-"Russians is a mature nation, not something like amorphous ethnic group"15.  A cynic kind of argument is also used: a new conception "may deprive Rossia's authorities of many arguments in defending rights of ethnic Russians abroad, so far they may become a part of Latvian, Moldova, Uzbek or other nations".

It is true that Russian nationalism is gaining its significance and becomes a serious factor of political life. The idea of nation is a key element in the platform and in a vocabulary of this movement. Leader of extreme nationalist Russian Party Nikolai Bondarick expressed it in a following way: "In Russia it is the Russians who should govern... Russia must have Russian Government, Russian Parliament of ethnic Russians belonging the Great Nation by blood and by spirit..."Everything is for the nation and nothing is against of it", - this logo must be in brain and spirit, in flesh and blood of every Russians, because we are all only sells of one great organism named a Nation"16. The Russian nationalism has its certain historical roots and contemporary explanations. In 1994 the topic became a frontpage for the World mass-media which in many respect not clarify but prescribe neofasist behaviour by affection of televising. To consider the phenomenon more carefully a conclusion could be done that in its explicitly ethnic form it is rather new and mainly elitist enterprise. When in the late XIXth century for the first time the idea and the word "nation" acquired its adjective "Russian" (russkaya) and till 1940-th (from Struve to Berdyaev) it was carrying its ambivalence with defining all population of the state or at least its Russian orthodoxy populace. The word "Russian nation" as "rysskaya nazia" has appeared in wider public discourse predominantly through official propaganda significantly later. When it started to impose a hierarchy of "socialist nations and narodnosti" and this schema could not be considered as completed without "great Russian nation". Proper contributions to affirm for ethnic Russians its place in Soviet "nomenclature" of ethno-nations was done by academic and literary writers, like historian Boris Rybakov, philologist Dmitrii Likhachev, authors Chivilikhin, Astafiev, and others, added by many superficial and emotional writings of explicitly nationalist and even racist character (Shafarevich, Soloukhin, Gumiliev, etc.).

In reality it was a form of ideologically motivated elitist usurpation of  grass-root identity expressed in the notion of "Russian people" (russki narod) and Russian culture. The term "people" is still the basic category with which ethnic Russians identify themselves as well as other ethnic groups. There is nothing embarrassing or subversive if they stay be attached this basic category instead of long-debatable and controversial definition - "nation". This new concept does not deny the very fact of existence of Russian or other cultures and based on them feelings of belonging certain ethno-cultural entities. As to ethnic Russians, Eduard Bagramov was not far from the truth: as many other large and spatially dispersed people Russians do have in some aspects quite amorphous identities. Cultural distances between geographical groups of Russians (those who live in Pomor area and those who live in the Caucasus, for example) may be greater then between Russians and those locals with whom they are contacting for centuries. In some areas Russians participate in a phenomenon of bordering culture with mixed and specifically regional identities, like in bilingual and bicultural belt between Ukraine and Rossia, or between Belorussia and Rossia. For many of those Russians who found themselves recently on territories out of Rossia, ethnic/cultural and civic identities may peacefully co-exist. A survey done by Estonian sociologists show that about 95% of Russians living in the north-eastern Estonia wanted to be citizens or would like to see their children as citizens of Estonia17. In case these Russians would become loyal citizens of the new state and participate its economy and culture why they could not be members of Estonian nation, like they became and considered by themselves and by local societies in The United States or in France where they moved a century or decades ago?

It is potentially dangerous for the ex-Communist World to proceed with the same Leninist/Stalinist project to draw two different maps: one - for states, another - for ethno-nations, and then arbitrary to reconcile borders of these two entities. History has already knew two states with constitutions and doctrines reflecting this political utopia. It were ex-Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union. That is why it is so important for the West to assist overcoming the burdens of the Communist legacies not only with restructuring economy and political order but also ideology and practice of ethnic nationalism. It does not require financial aid. It requires only to follow political principles and legal norms which Western societies and international community at large apply for themselves.

What could be done by the West as a response to this appeal? I do not expect a strong statement on a part of Mr.Clinton in favour of Rossia's integrity: the US President has also to deal with Wilsonian legacies in form of recipes for the outside World and with the old guards still celebrating global liberal victory but some small steps could be done. As a goodwill message it is easier to start with linguistic changes and bring into Latin-graphic languages two new words "Rossia" and "Rossians" as more proper translation from the Russian language in which it defines the name of the state and the name of its people. By and large it is not a small issue: ambivalent language produce ambivalent politics.

Responses of and for the ethnic "periphery"

Together with Russian nationalists the most vocal opponents of building the state on civic and individual rights principles are represented by non-Russian intellectual and political leaders mainly based in republics of Rossia. There are two hardly conciliating processes are taking place in republics. One is could be qualified as positive and democratic: with a support of ethnic electorate and a part of non-titulars (mainly Russians) republican ethnic leaders lead a resolute political struggle with the centre for redistributing powers in favour of regions and for implementing effective federal system. In this stand they are enjoying also a support of the leaders of administrative regions of the country. Another process is imposing of narrow nationalistic and non-democratic norms and rules aimed to imply an exclusive status for so-called "indigenous nations" often at the expense of Russian majority (or minority) and other local minorities. It causes new and conflict generating tensions and sometimes results in things like ethnic cleansing in Northern Ossetia. In many respects Rossian republics became strongholds of conservative opposition to democratic changes, including market reforms and privatization, developing stronger local self-governance. Republican elites do not want to let process of redistributing and sharing of power to go further on lower levels and prefer to build their own "mini-empires".

In this situation a proposal to build new political order on individual rights principles and to implement into doctrinal and legal discourse a notion of civic Rossian nation presents a serious challenge for republican elites and may undermine its status based on Soviet version of ethno-nationalist doctrine. Mass sentiments in favour of this resentment could be mobilized because it is quite easy to interpret new doctrine as a camouflage form of Russian chauvinism or of discredited slogan of "merging of Soviet nations". An obstacle for civic state doctrine on a part of non-Russian nationalism is serious but its strength should not be overestimated.

First, majority of non-Russians leave outside of their "own" republics or do not have it at all, like 75% of Tatars and 60% of Mordvins or 6 million of Ukrainians, 1 million of Jews, 1 million of Volga Germans, etc. Among these people a feeling of belonging civic entity of Rossians (without denying its cultural identities and interests) is very strong and the doctrine itself is appealing and had already gained certain support. By and large it provides them more assertion to be considered and behaved on equal terms with the rest of the population.

Second, there are few strategies and mechanisms could be used to cope with ethno-nationalism in republics18. As it was demonstrated, multivariable federalist system of the state with republics qualified as internal states with their own constitutions and high level of sovereignty could be exchanged on a concession to omit a label "national". Making multiethnic centre from the point of view of political representation and cultural control is another strategy for strengthening loyalties to the civic entity formed by a larger state. Inventing and introducing new Rossian symbols and values not associated  exclusively with one culture and incomfortably perceived by representatives of others is a delicate and an important issue. The record of the Eltzin's government is quite poor concerning civic symbols: double-headed eagle of the Russian Empire was reestablished as an official state emblem and the Orthodox church is trying to take a status of a state religion (both elements are badly considered by many non-Russians). At the same time one of few newly emerged national symbols  - Belyi Dom (White House) of the Russian Parliament was occupied by the executive bureaucrats after October 1993 events. There are still many opportunities for imaginations and efforts to provide multicultural symbolism and hegemonic idea for a new nation.

Third, there is no need to enforce a mutually exclusive loyalties in a process of nation-building. It is world-wide phenomenon that people considered legally and regard themselves, for example, member of Norwegian nation and of Saami people, member of Spanish nation and of Catalan, Castile or Basque groups, being a Mexican and at the time Nahua or one of many Maya groups. Introducing new definition of civic nation as an official and probably legal category there is no need to exclude or forbid old vocabulary. In Rossia, as well as in many other areas of the World, the word "nation" is used by minorities leaders in political purposes and it may serve its consolidating role and even implicitly was recognised on a level of non-governmental organizations' structures. So far, in Norway indigenous leaders may use a term "Saami nation", in the USA - "Hawaiian" or "Navaho nation", in Spain - "Basque nation", etc. There is no sense to oppose the use of the term among Rossian nationalities, although the term "nationalities" seems more appropriate. It is less politically loaded and is widely recognised among experts in and outside of Rossia. That is a state if it is legitimized by a civic society should use the term in legal and propaganda language in more disciplined and responsible way. Another social agents may use it on a basis of a free choice. Political language innovations are important but linguistic rigorism in politics is dangerous. As we can observe some states even may not recognize other states when it seems from their point of view that these others use a wrong word for self-labelling. In all cases a costructive search for a new Russia identity is more fruitful then an appeal for "a firm creation of a felicitous environment" formulated by Zbigniew Brzezinski.



References:

1. Brzezinski Z. The Premature Partnership. - Foreign Relations, March/April 1994, p.72,79

2.Michael L. In Defence of Liberal Nationalism. - Foreign Relations, May/June 1994, p.99

3. "Rech", Gazeta Russkoi Partii, n1, 1993, p.1

4. A quote from Raphael Khakimov, Presidential advicer, during negotiationg on Russia-Tatarstan Treaty, summer 1992 (personal notes).

5. Lustick I. Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza, Cornell University Press, 1993

6. See most widely acclaimed works on the origin of nationalism by B.Anderson, E.Gellner, E.Hobsbaum, M.Hroch.

7. Greenfeld L. Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity. Harvard University Press, 1993, p.274

8. See, for example: Yulian Bromley, Theoretical Ethnography. 1986. Moscow: Nauka

9. Dubravka Ugresic, "Parrots and Priests: "before" and "after" in Yugoslavia," Times Literary Supplement, 15 May 1992, 12.

10. Dimitri Simes, The Return of Russian History. Foreign Affairs, Jan./Febr. 1994, p.74

11. Smith M.P. Postmodernism, urban ethnography, and the new social space of ethnic identity. - Theory and Society, 1992, vol.21, p.526

12. Tishkov V. The Invention and Manifestation of Ethno-nationalism in and after the Soviet Union. 1992. Rupersinghe, Kumar, et al. eds. Ethnicity and Conflict in a post-Communist World: the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China. New York: St.Martin's Press.

13. "Rossiiskaya gazeta", February 25, 1994

14. Eduard Bagramov, Nazia kak sograzhdanstvo? (Nation as co-citizenship?). "Nezavisimaya gazeta", March 15, 1994

15. Ibidem

16. "Rech", Gazeta of Russian Party, 1993, n.1, p.4

17.Kirch's article forthcoming in JPR. See also: Valery Tishkov, Russians as a minority (case of Estonia). Working papers in applied and urgent ethnology. N.52. Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology. Moscow, 1993.

18. More on this see: Valery Tishkov, Nationalism and Conflicting Ethnicity in post-Soviet Russia. Working paper under the project Management of ethnic Conflict in the Former Soviet Union. Conflict Management Group, Harvard, 1993.