CULTURES AND LANGUAGES IN CONFLICT

By the mid-1980s an extremely contradictory situation developed in the sphere of social functions of languages and cultures of Soviet nationalities. On the one hand, in the republics and autonomous regions, the government policy, begun in the 1920s of development and support of non-Russian language and culture, was continued. On the other hand, the Russian language received further dissemination into daily urban culture with its unified effects. Scholars, including ethnologists, have dedicated many detailed investigations to these contradictory processes (Sovremennye ethnicheskie...1977:259-432; Sotsial'no-kulturnyi oblik...1986). But analyses did not go far-reaching conclusions. Without going into the details of cultural-linguistic development, we will underline that the dissemination of the Russian language, norms and stereotypes of "common Soviet" culture through the Russian-language official and prestigious institutions among the non-Russian population of the Soviet Union was a result not only of the influence of the culture of the dominant nationality, represented by the Russians, but in the last decades was blatantly forced by regional republican nomenclatura.

In the Political Statement of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the 27th Party Congress Michael Gorbachev declared the formation of a "new social and international community - the Soviet people" and its "Soviet multinational socialist culture"as one of the primary aims of nationality policy in the country in the preceding period. The goal of the strengthening and further development of what had been achieved in this sphere was formulated for the future (Materials 27th Congress... 1986:53). Naturally, "the Soviet people" as the carrier of "Soviet culture" must share as well a linguistic commonality. Thus, the goal of "mastering Russian as well as the language of one's own language, voluntarily accepted by the Soviet people as a means on international communication", occupied an important place in the new version of the Communist Party Program of the Soviet Union at the 27th Party Congress. Simultaneously the Program guaranteed "and in the future to protect the free development and equal rights to use their native language for all citizens of the Soviet Union" (Materials of the 27th Congress...1986:157). Such priorities of cultural-linguistic politics, together with the retained thesis of the "further blooming and rapprochement" of Soviet nationalities, in reality pushed local organs of power to the forced dissemination of the Russian language and cultural-ideological publications among the non-Russian populations of the Soviet Union through the mass media, educational system, industrial and military collectives.

In this case we will not try to evaluate to what extent this dissemination of the Russian language and of common Soviet cultural values were formed, and to what extent this was a natural process in a country in which Russians were both the primary initiators of Soviet statehood and the ethnic majority. The fact that this country went through industrialization and rapid development of cities in the 20th century had an undeniable influence on the creation of a cultural unification. Whatever the actual relative importance of these factors, the results of their combined actions became perceived by the creative intelligentsia of non-Russian nationalities as the result of deliberate efforts towards "Russification" in the spheres of language and culture through state politics. By the way, this very process of the dissemination of "socialist Soviet culture" also produced dissatisfaction amongst Russians themselves, on the part of the creative intelligentsia, primarily writers. For many of them, including those appearing as dissidents of the political regime, this signified simultaneously a "loss of one's roots" and forgetting of the traditions of Russian folk (primarily peasant) culture. This served as one of the chief causes in the birth of the Russian national-patriotic movement, which in many circumstances appears as the political analogue of the ethno-national movements among other nationalities of the Soviet Union.

As a result, in 1990-91, slogans of a battle for the rebirth of Russian cultural, religious and national traditions including nostalgic symbolism , like diublehead eagle, tzarist flag, Orthdox crest, etc., played an important role in the mobilization of the masses in support of the opposition forces of Russia in their challenge to the Soviet center. This latter was viewed as a stronghold of the Communists - supporters of "denationalized" or even "anti-national" culture. In its turn,  the  Russian nationalist rhetoric cused a resentment among a significant part of non-Russian population. Thus, the true preconditions of ethnic tensions did in fact exist in the Soviet Union at the beginning of perestroika in the sphere of language and culture. Consequently at least two variants of interethnic contradictions arose on these grounds.

1. At the beginning of perestroika arose conflicts of ethno-national movements of the titular nationalities of union and autonomous republics with the Soviet center. Their initiators tried to stop the process of "russification" and to achieve not a formal, but an actually equal or even advantageous status for the languages and cultures of the titular nationalities in these republics.

2. Soon after the languages and cultures of the titular nationalities of the Republics achieved priority status on their territories. The radical shift was not declared until in the republican laws on the state languages enacted at the end of the 1980s. Then the non-titular population, asserting its cultural linguistic interests and rights, with the power institutions of the Soviet and autonomous republics. These last, under the pressure of ethno-national movements of titular nationalities, continued just as actively to defend the cultural-linguistic interests of the titular population of the republics.

The demise of the Soviet Union into 15 independent states did not eliminate ethnic tensions on cultural-linguistic grounds. All newly formed republics remained multiethnic in composition, and therefore cultural-linguistic conflicts between their titular and non-titular populations continue to exist. The appraisal of the actual cultural differences between nationalities inhabiting the former Soviet Union appear as a separate and very difficult puzzle. We will  note that many cultural phenomena acquired a clear political symbolism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and thus served as a cause for the intensication, or even appearance, of ethnic conflicts.

Fighting for symbols

The process of the return to the symbols of previous states formerly existing on the territory of the Soviet Union played a defined role in the formation of ethno-national groups and their programs. Thus, in the Baltic republics the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian flags of the 1920s and 30s were restored. At the beginning as "ethno-national flags" of the titular nationalities they coexisted with the official flags of these socialist republics. The same process later took place in Moldavia,Transcaucasus and practically in all former Soviet republics. In Russia, for example, the democratic opposition revived the red-white-blue flag (now the National flag of Russia), and the national-patriotic movement began to use the black-orange-yellow flag also originating during the period of the Russian Empire.

On the contrary, political movements defending the interests of the non-titular, "russophone" population in the Baltics and Moldavia, for a long time deliberately did not recognize the attempts to change the state (republic) symbols and led their mass meetings and demonstrations under the flags of the Soviet State, or the official flags of the corresponding Soviet republics. Moldavian ethno-national movement demanded that the official alphabet be changed from Cyrillic script(of Russian type) to the Latin script used in neighboring Rumania with practically identical language. This, combined with the acceptance of the Rumanian flag, served as a. causes for the confrontations between titular and russophone populations. Leaders of the non-titulars saw in this policy a step towards the "rumanization" of the republic and reacted strongly against (Kul'chik and Rumyantsev 1991:4).

A similar symbolism, as an important and graphic part of ethnic cultures, served as a powerful cause, first of the demarcation of the republic's population along ethnic lines. Second, it gave a clear "ethnic color" to the mass political movements formed in the late 1980s in the republics - national fronts, parties, etc. To a very significant extent this made possible their transformation into ethno-nationalistic coalitions at the very beginning.

Name changing

 The field of ethnonyms and toponyms, that is, the names of nationalities, countries and cities, became a part of the political battle for ethnic cultural symbolism through the former Soviet periphery. A wave of returning former ethnic names and linguistic corrections from russian-language euphony and accepted traditions swept the former Soviet periphery. Moldavia became "Moldova", Yakutia - "Sakha", Kirgiz- Kyrygyz, and states of the Turkic-speaking world acquired the ending "-stan": Bashkiria - Bashkortostan, Tataria - Tatarstan, Kirgizia - Kyrgyzstan.

This was not simply a farewell to Soviet symbolism and Bolshevik heroes, and not simply a return to pre-Soviet names. The priority of the titular nationalities was confirmed, in symbolic forms, through the language of the names. Thus, for example, the capital of Kirghizia - Frunze was renamed Bishkek (a Kirghiz name of the settlement whose etymology is not clearly understood even by the Kirgiz themselves). However, the capital of Kazakhstan remains Alma-Ata, for its pre-Soviet (until 1921) name of the city, Vernyi (Russian meaning "true, faithful") was too blatantly tied with Russian colonization. Preference was given to a slightly preciser reading from the Kazakh -Almaty (this was the name of the Kazakh settlement located here until the founding of the Russian military fort in 1854).

The renaming of cities, streets, rivers and other topographical sites took on a mass character after the formation of independent states and sovereign republics on the territory of the Russian Federation (after the August coup of 1991). This process became an expression of an "internal self-defining" in the system of cultural symbols, and is clearly far from being completed. Recently leaders of some ethnic groups put forth the possibility of changing the ethnonyms themselves, considering them "humiliating" or too closely tied to colonization". Not realizing that the majority of nationality names are exoetnyms(that is, given by other nations during interethnic contacts), they present demands to change the name "Tatars" to "Bulgars", "Eskimos" to "Yupiks", etc.).

As a rule, conflict generating moments arise, when the titular groups in new states try,through linguistic aggression, to realize political measures for the limitation of the rights of minorities or to do away with existing territorial autonomies. For example, Georgia rejected the name South Ossetia in favor of the Georgian word Shida-Kartli (inner-Kartlia) or Samochablo - the name of a royal estate which was declared the "heart of Georgia". In response the southern Ossetians changed the name of their administrative center from Tzinvali to Tzhinval, and the Abkhazians began to call Sukhumi Sukhum. From this one letter "i" developed a harsh political, and then military clash. For Armenians there is no Karbakh more, but there is Artzah; for Azerbaijani, it remains Karabakh.

Back to religion and archaic norms

The rebirth of religion as a cultural symbol and the strengthening of its role in social life has also, in many cases, contributed to the division of the population along ethnic lines. As is well-known, many titular nationalities of Soviet and autonomous republics are traditionally Islamic. This includes in Central Asia and Kazakhstan: Uzbeks,Tadzhiks, Turkmen, Kirgiz, Kazakhs, Karakalpaks; in the Transcaucasus - Azerbaijanis and Adzhars (muslim Georgians) of the Adzhar autonomous region of Georgia; in the northern Caucasus - Adygeis, Karachaevs and Cherkes,Kabardines and Balkars, some of the Ossetians (Digors minority), Chechens and Ingush, the nationalities of Dagestan; in Povolzh'e and in the Urals - Tatars, Bashkirs; in the Crimea - Crimean Tatars. Buryats, Tuvins and Kalmyks are lamaist Buddhists, although some of the Kalmyks and Buryats are converts to Orthodox Christianity.

The general rebirth of traditional religions as an integral part of national culture, which began in the late 1980s, led to changes in the official calendars of the republics. Almost everywhere religious holidays became new nonworking days. This means that, for example, Russians, Ukrainians and other "Europeans" in "Islamic" and "Buddhist" republics received time off on Islamic and Buddhist holidays, but not Christian ones. On the other hand, Muslims and Buddhists in many of their compact traditional settlements in parts of Russia now have days off for Christmas, but must go to work at government employers on their chief religious holiday. Certainly this factor in the strengthening of the ethnic demarcation of the Soviet population appears insignificant against the background of a row of others. However, it plays its role in the formation of interethnic conflicts. Most important here is the huge symbolic role of the new holidays, which clearly indicate who is considered insiders and who outsiders on various territories of the former Soviet Union. Earlier in the Soviet Union all official holidays had a strictly secular character and therefore were equally close to (or far) from all, regardless of religious belief.

The revival of Islam generated discussion in the mass media and even in the parliaments of several Central Asian republics (for example in Kirgizia at the beginning of 1992) about the possible legalization of poligamy. Although these proposals have not been realized in any state legislation, they have greatly contributed to the alienation of the "European" Russian-speaking population from the native inhabitants.

Discussing the role of cultural symbols and values in generating ethnic conflicts, we would like to underline that after the demise of the Soviet Union the issue rarely involves the direct violation or restriction of rights and interests of the non-titular population. Such violations were the rule in the Soviet Union due to the force implantation of "common Soviet" culture amongst all nationalities of the country. Peculiarities connected with the perception of the officially dominant social-cultural group as people of a different (nontitular) group now become obvious. The actual, or only declared, rebirth and dominance of the cultural traditions of the titular populations in the social life of the republics and autonomous regions has  increased the social distance between titular and non-titular populations. The relatively recent 180° turn in the mass media also has great significance in this respect. Until the second half of the 1980s the press minimized cultural differences between Soviet nationalities and propagated their rapprochement as a final move to the most "modern" and "progressive" forms of urban culture in its "common Soviet" form. At the turn of the decade, in contrast, prevailing themes became the uniqueness of the national culture of the titular population of the territories, sharp criticisms of previous attempts to annihilate their uniqueness, and calls to facilitate the rebirth of cultural traditions. In such a situation the nontitular nationality experienced a sudden transfer from "their" comfortable cultural concept of one country, the Soviet Union, to a new and unfamiliar country of another nationality with its own, not always understood, culture. They begin to feel themselves not only alienated, but unwanted. This provokes their exit or preparation to emigrate, which is a powerful, and even not always conscious, stimulus for the organization of their own political movements, formed to defend their interests.

Languages in conflict

Despite the importance of cultural preconditions in the appearance of ethnic conflicts, linguistic causes have also played a great and often definitive role in this process. The situation in the actual dissemination and functioning of languages in the Soviet Union can be characterized in detail,using data from population censuses. However, the direct use of Soviet census data concerning various nationalities's mastery of Russian and of their native tongues is quite complicated. In Soviet censuses first the ethnic origin of the person is determined, then his "mother tongue", and next a "second language of a Soviet nationality which he speaks fluently". In this context, responses to the question "mother tongue" are, to a significant extent, predetermined by the respondent's ethnic self-identification. Therefore, for example, it is impossible to directly apply data on the "mother tongue" to determine the actual importance or daily use of this language, even in the family. Thus, in 1989 99% of Kazakhs living in Kazakhstan, identified Kazakh as their native tongue (calculated from: National Census...,1991:102). However, according to the calculations of specialists, approximately 40% of the Kazakhs in the republic speak Kazakh either poorly or not at all. Its active use is limited to 10 out of 50 spheres of social life (Kuanyshev, 1991:40).

An equally clear example, and notably greater paradox, is the linguistic situation in Grodnen Oblast in Belorus, located in the northwest part of the republic, bordering Poland and Lithuanian. Here, far from the border with Russia, the population consists of 60% Belorussians, 26% Poles and 11% Russians. According to the 1989 census, 68% of the population identified Belorussian as their native tongue (this figure includes 85% of Belorussians and 62% of Poles). Another 12% of the population claimed fluency in Belorussian as a second language. 27% of the population of the Grodnen region consider Russian their native language (this figure includes 15% of Belorussians and 22% of Poles), and another 46% are fluent in Russian as a second language (national Census..., 1991:90-91). However, data from a special investigation in 1989-90 draws an entirely different picture of the actual linguistic situation in Grodnen oblast. Participants were chosen to reflect the approximate ethnic constitution of the population. According to the results of this questionnaire, 91% of the respondents have a fluent command of Russian, 38% of Belorussian, and 3% of Polish. The language used within the family, at work and in public places was, respectively: Belorussian 9%, 3%, 3%, Polish 3%, 0.4%, 0.5%, and Russian 67%, 78% and 81% (Bogush 1991:29). 

Clearly, the proportion of persons indicating as "native" the language of their nationality by no means corresponds to the proportion for it is the primary conversational language, or even who are more competent in that language better than in another language. For this reason, the calculation of changes between the censuses of 1926, 1959, and 1990 of the share of the population indicating as native tongue the language of their nationality (for nationalities which had Soviet and autonomous republics and oblasts) cannot be considered essentially informative. Certainly they cannot serve as the foundation for conclusions about the linguistic situation in the former Soviet Union (e.g. see, Sovremennye etnicheskie..., 1977:301-302). On the other hand, nor do calculations of the proportion of the population with mastery of Russian as a second language as calculated from population censuses and many scientific works (e.g. Sovremennye etnicheskie..., 1977:310) reflect the actual dissemination of Russian in the Republics and autonomous oblasts. In this case, it is not taken into account that frequently 10-20% and even up to 40% of people, particularly those of the titular nationalities of Russian autonomies (Karels, Mordevs, Koms, etc.) claim Russian as their native language and consequently, are fluent?  

To a great degree the data introduced in Table 1 help judge the actual dissemination and social functions of various languages. Our calculations are based on primary materials taken from the 1989 Census (USSR Census... 1991); The column "fluent in Russian language of the titular nationality includes the combined figures of those a) who named that language as native, despite a lack of correlation between language and ethnic background, b) who claimed fluency (if it was not claimed as a native tongue) as a 2nd language. These figures include all representatives of that nationality living in the corresponding republic or autonomous oblast. In other words, this indicator exactly reflects the percentage of larger ethnic groups of the republics and autonomies who indicated the corresponding (Russian or titular) language as one of their first two languages. True, in this case the possibility of knowledge of a 3rd language is not considered, but published Soviet census materials do not supply such information. Knowledge of a 3rd language is indicated but the language is not specified.

For example, in Belorus the quota of Belorussians fluent in Russian" divided according to the above example, includes those who named Russian as their native language (20%),and those who considered either Belorussian or another language as native, but indicated fluent in Russian as a 2nd language (another 60%). In reality, 80% of Belorussians know, that is can freely speak, Russian. Exactly thus, in Belorussia, the category Russians "fluent in the language of the titular nationality" (in this case Belorussian), unites those who named Belorussian as their native language (2%), and those who, considering Russian or another language as their native language, indicated fluent mastery of Belorussian as a 2nd language (another 25%). Accordingly, 27% of Russians in Belorus know and can easily use Belorussian. Thus, on the data of Soviet population censuses, it is impossible to determine what part, for example, of Belorussians actually know Belorussian. As we attempted to show above, information about the native language, when it corresponds with the respondent's ethnic background, frequently fails to reflect his actual knowledge or use of this language.

A few more remarks about the reliability and accuracy of the information in Table 1. First, until January 1989, when the Soviet population census was carried out, ethnic conflicts had led to clashes and pogroms only in the Transcaucasus. In other regions ethno-national movements were still only beginning and mass political practically didn't exist. In this manner, the information regarding mastery of the language of the titular nationalities of the republics should, in the majority of cases, be entirely representative and not distorted by the consequent confrontational conditions with representatives of the nontitulr population. Second, this may conditionally be applied to information about mastery of Russian by the titular populations of the republics and autonomies. However, here the errors are more significant. To some extent, by the beginning of 1989 many titular nationalities of Soviet republics had begun experiencing a psychological alienation from common-Soviet culture, ideology, and the Russian language, which was disseminated and propagated with them. Besides this in recent decades Ukrainians and Belorussians have habitually underestimated the degree of their mastery of Russian. They often believe, considering the closeness of these mutually comprehensible languages, that they can speak only a "Russian-Ukrainian (or Belorussian) blend" and do not consider it actual Russian (understanding this latter only its correct literary form). Also, information regarding the nontitular Turkic-speaking nationalities's mastery of the republic's official language is clearly understated when the titular language is another Turkic language. As is the case with the Slavic nationalities, the respondents here answer the census question as knowledge of the literary form of the titular language. in reality, due to the closeness of the majority of Turkic languages, their native speakers can easily communicate with each other on a basic level after very little informal study. This primarily concerns Bashkir, Tatar and Chuvash.

The Baltic nationalities were also inclined to understate their knowledge of Russian, but this was more due to its strong unpopularity in that region. On the contrary, in Central Asia and the Caucasus, mastery of Russian was considered highly prestigious and therefore in these regions information concerning the dissemination of Russian may, in many cases, be overstated. In Povolozh'e and Siberia, information about the actual knowledge of Russian is more reliable. The prestigiousness of a knowledge of Russian is combined with almost daily contact with native speakers, complicates a self-overrating in this field. Finally, it is worth introducing some general information about the Soviet Union. In 1989, the population was 285.7 million (including 145 million Russians, 44 million Ukrainians, 16.7 million Uzbeks, 10 million Belorussians, 8 million Kazakhs), of which 57% considered Russian their native language (including 18.7 million non-Russians). Another 24% of the population named Russian as their second language. This gives a sum of 81% of the Soviet population with a knowledge of Russian.

The data from Table 1 testify to two important results of linguistic politics in the Soviet Union which, naturally, could not immediately change the division of the former Soviet state into 15 new states. First, significant spread of Russian among titular nationalities in the Soviet republics demands attention (only in Turkmenia and Uzbekistan is this indicator somewhat lower - 28% and 27% respectively). In Lithuania and Kazakhstan, where the proportion of Russians in the population is particularly high, 68% of Lithuanians and 64% of Kazakhs know Russian. Ukraine and Belorus occupy a particular situation in which, due to historical ties and the similarity of East-Slavic languages, this indicator rises to 72% and 80%. In the former autonomous republics of the Russian Federation a still greater part of the titular population speaks Russian: - 70% - 95% (only in Tuv is it 60%).

It is essential to note that, as a rule, among the "nonstatus" nationalities of the Soviet and autonomous republics, that is belonging to neither the titular or the Russian populations, a substantial percentage know Russian and not the language of the titular nationality, although this last is the official state language. Thus in Lithuania, 67% of the Poles know Russian and only 21% know Lithuanian; in Moldova 80% of the Gagauz speak Russian and only 6% Moldovan;in Azerbaijian 69% of the Armenians know Russian and only 7% Azerbaijiani; in Kazakhstan among Germans and Tatars, respectively 96% and 92%, speak Russian and only 7% speak Kazakh. The linguistic situation in the autonomies located outside the Russian Federation is even more indicative in this respect. Thus, 57% of the Armenians of Nagorny Karabakh know Russian, but only 0.3% know Azerbaijiani; 22% of the Azerbaijani of Nagorny Karabakh know Russian and only 2% know Armenian. Abkhazia demonstrates a similar tendency: 84% of Abkhazians speak Russian and 2% speak Georgian;the local Armenians know Russian (82%) and Georgian (1%) but not Abkhazian. In Southern Ossetia,like Abkhazia located in Georgia, 60% of the Ossetians know Russian, and 15% know Georgian. The materials in Table 1 give many such examples.

A second distinctive tendency is the local Russian populations' lack of mastery of the language of the titular nationality. Excluding Belorussia and the Ukraine, where the corresponding indicators are 27% and 34%, and Lithuania, where Russians are a statistically insignificant minority and this indicator for them is 38%, Russians' knowledge of the official state language of the titular nationality is only 5-25%. In the republics of the Russian Federation only 1-3% of the Russians master the languages of the titular nationalities.

These and much other data from Table 1 affirm the sufficiently obvious fact, that the former Soviet Union historically was formed and developed as a state in which the ethnic majority of the population was Russian and therefore Russian dominated on its territory, although the degree of its domination had substantial regional variations. In addition, this fact strongly influenced the behavior of the non-Russian population which, in the majority of cases aimed to master primarily Russian, rather than the language of some other nationality or even the language of their own nationality. There are only a few exclusions, in which an ethnic minority knew the "republic" language more than Russian. This relates to the Kurd-Iezids of Armenia, the Lezgins and Avars of Azerbaijian, the Ossetians of the inner (not located in Southern Ossetia) regions of Georgia, the Tadzhiks of Uzbekistan, and the Badaxshan Kirgiz of Tadzhikistan.

The statement of the above-described situation in the sphere of the relative dissemination of languages in the former Soviet Union serves as yet another proof of the fact that in the conditions of the Soviet Union practically all non-Russian nationalities, in reality found themselves in the position of cultural-linguistic minorities of this Russian-language state, and thus life itself forced them to learn Russian. We fully apply this conclusion also to the majority of regions with historically ethnically-mixed populations. In such conditions, neighboring ethnic groups adapted (mastered the language and social norms) not so much to each other, as to the Russian-speaking majority of the Soviet population.

The example of Nagorny Karabakh very clearly expresses this situation. The local Armenians in the cultural-linguistic sense in no sense considered themselves, and truly were not, a minority in Azerbaijian, to which the Nagorny-Karabakh autonomous oblast officially belonged. More than anything they behaved as a minority in the Soviet Union as a whole and therefore mastered Russian (57% knowing Russian), and not Azerbaijiani (3% correspondingly). But the Azerbaijiani living in Nagorny Karabakh, also did not become in the full sense of the word a cultural-linguistic minority of this autonomy, primarily Armenian, by the composition of the population.Thus, 22% of the Azerbaijiani of Nagorny Karabakh knew Russian and only 2% knew Armenian. In this manner, the ethnic groups of this region had a very weak mutual cultural-linguistic influence. Interaction with (or rather adaptation to) the common-Soviet Russian-language social-cultural environment/medium had primary significance. In such a situation the formal status of the "titular" or "nontitular" nationality had minimal significance, and there was not particular sense in exploring whose language was "more important" on the territory, for example, of Nagorny Karabakh:Armenian (the language of the titular nationality of that autonomy) or Azerbaijiani (the language of the titular nationality of the republic, in which the given autonomy was located). In the actual life of the middle and upper social levels of the population of Nagorny Karabakh Russian played a leading role and mastery of Russian was essential for Armenians, as for Azerbaijianis, for a successful rise up the social ladder.

The collapse of the Soviet Union radically changed the ideological and political situation of linguistic problems. Millions of Russians and representatives of other nontitular nationalities found themselves in the position of ethnic minorities (formerly they considered themselves part of the cultural-linguistic majority of the Soviet Union). Thus, the primary cultural-linguistic problem for the majority of states emerging from the territory of the former Soviet Union is not even the practical protection of the corresponding rights of ethnic minorities, but the transformation of the local Russian and Russian-speaking population, previously oriented primarily toward Russian language and common Soviet culture, into a true ethnic minority of these new states, in one degree or another knowing the official state languages and sharing the primary cultural traditions of the titular nationalities. It is not too great an exaggeration to say that this process began in the late 1980s-early 1990s almost uncommented, and in many cases the accomplishment of this goal demands the realization of a radical change in the cultural-linguistic development not only of the last 70 years, but of previous centuries.

Language legislations

This digression into the cultural-linguistic politics of the Soviet Union was essential in order to show the objective preconditions for contemporary ethnic conflicts on these grounds. The creation of new states on the territory of former Soviet republics, and the formation of state sovereignty in former autonomies of the Russian Federation took place within the framework of the doctrine of ethnic nationalism. New independent states and Russian republics are perceived first of all as national states of the titular nationalities. This doctrine dictated cardinal changes in linguistic politics. Primary was the proclamation of an official program to oust Russian in favor of the languges of the titular nationalities, in all spheres of social life. In the majority of Soviet republics the languages of the titular population became official state languages, and corresponding "Language Laws" were introduced. One of the chief consequences of these laws was the translation of official office-work (officially extended over 2-4 years) in all state institutions and enterprises into the language of the titular nationality, and the introduction of state examinations or certifications of knowledge of that language among a sufficiently wide circle of government employees and, most importantly, among supervisors. For the majority of the nontitular population, this signified not only the necessity to quickly master the language of the titular population, but also a material change in their social status and career possibilities. Earlier that category of the population, usually with the best mastery of Russian, had a certain natural advantage over people of the titular nationalities in receiving a quality education or professional training in Russian and in promotion to the highest posts in the many organizations of the Union subordination?, acting in the republics. After the appearance of the laws regarding official state languages, approximately corresponding in time with the changing over of the subordination of most Soviet organizations to republic governing organs, the situation for representatives of the nontitular population radically changed.To the old common-Soviet principle encouraging the social promotion of people of the titular nationalities in "national"-republican institutions was added the clear advantage of the latter in mastery of their native language, which had become the official state language.

In almost all regions of the former there are many cases in which precisely linguistic issues at the end of the 1980s sharply intensified or even generated ethnic conflicts. In Moldova, for example, the conflict of the Gagauz and primarily Russian-Ukrainian population of the Dniestr region with the republican government became a truly mass movement following the introduction in Kishinev of a resolution to certify, in the shortest possible time, supervisors and professionals?? knowledge of Moldovian (Rumanian). In real terms, this would have led to the mass firing of local leaders - non-Moldovians, and their replacement by Moldovians (Kul'chik, Rumyantsev, 1991:9). In Kazakhstan the "State Program for the Development of the Kazakh Language" stipulates the translation of all the republic's office-work and documentation into Kazakh by 1994. This called forth sharp dissatisfaction on the part of Russian and other groups of the non-Kazakh population, particularly in the northern and northeast raions and oblasts of Kazakhstan, where Kazakhs are a minority. For example, this greatly contributed to an increase in activities of the Russian and Kazakh ethno-national movements in the city of Ural'sk, the historical center of the Urals (that is Russian) Kazakhs, where Kazakhs are only 23% of the population (Sagnaeva, 1991:3).

In the republics of the Transcaucasus, until the middle of the 1980s, the languages of the titular nationalities were formally according to the republic constitutions, the official languages. This distinguishes Azerbaijian, Armenia and Georgia from other Soviet republics, but did not, in any real sense, influence the relative dissemination of Russian and the languages of the titular nationalities in the Transcaucasus republics. Therefore, in Georgia for example, in 1988 a "State Program for the Development of the Georgian Language" was introduced, in part providing for the translation of all office work in the republic (including autonomies located in the republic) from Russian into Georgian. The leader of the Ossetian ethno-national movement in Southern Ossetia, which is classified as an autonomous oblast of Georgia, considers the adoption of this linguistic program as the turning point in the development of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, which developed into an armed confrontation as the result of attempts to carry out this linguistic program (Kulumbegov, 1192:4). The translation of all official documents from Russian and Ossetian into Georgian would have signified the creation of conditions for the almost unavoidable change of local leaders in Southern Ossetia, in which Geogians would replace Ossetians.

In this manner, in many regions of the former Soviet Union, cultural-linguistic factors generated or, in any case, contributed a particular flavor to ethnic conflicts. From the beginning these conflicts were called forth by attempts by the titular nationalities of the majority of Soviet republics and many autonomies of the Russian Federation to deny the actual situation of cultural-linguistic minorities in the Russian-speaking Soviet Union. With the progressive collapse of the Soviet Union and, correspondingly, the realization of such goals in newly-sovereign republics, conflicts of the nontitular populations (often acting as a whole) with the titular nationalities have begun to arise sharper and more frequently, leading to open force. The languages of the titular nationalities are already not only formally, but in reality, achieving leading positions. In other words, in this case, the question is no longer of the desire to escape from the situation of a cultural-linguistic minority through declaration of their "own" sovereign and independent republic. The problem is now more complex. In the last centuries, and, in particular during the decades of Soviet power, the nontitular, primarily Russian, populations of the former Soviet republics truly did not feel themselves to be cultural-linguistic minorities in these republics. The majority do not know the local languages and do not share the primary cultural stereotypes and norms of behavior of the titular nationalities. The question now is whether these very numerous residents of the republics will either simply refuse to recognize their transformation into a cultural-linguistic minority in the newly-formed states, or,f as is far more often the case, cannot, and therefore will openly refuse to, learn the languages of the titular nationalities in the excessively short time spans provided for by the republic governments.

From the above, it is not difficult to reach the conclusion, that cultural-linguistic factors, as such were recognized and influential only in the first stages of the development of ethnic conflicts. Many of them quickly developed into political reasons, that is, questions of power - who and on what level can and should define the grounds of ethno-cultural and linguistic politics. The Soviet Union's 70-year history of nation-building has deeply rooted in the social consciousness of all nationalities the concept that it is the state's role to determine cultural-linguistic politics and define their goals. The question at which level this state politics must be formulated has now become the subject of sharp political battle.After August of 1992 the Soviet level decisively disappeared but difficult problems have arisen in delineation of powers for the conducting of cultural-linguistic politics between republic governments and the political institutions of the autonomies located within them, between the leaders of newly-formed republics and compact settlements of the non-titular population.

Georgia can serve as an example of how linguistic problems are transformed into political problems and open conflict. Georgian was proclaimed the only official language of the republic. In response, the governments of autonomous Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia, which did not submit to this decision, declared three official languages on their territory: respectively Abkhazian or Ossetian, Georgian and Russian. That is, they proposed official tri-linguialism. In Moldova, where Moldovan (or Rumanian) received official status of the only state language, the regions of Pridnestrov and Gagauz made unauthorized declarations of new republics. (They based this on the rights of the autonomies). Their official languages were: Moldovan and Russian in both cases, and also Ukrainian (Pridnestrov) and Gagauz (Gagauz). In the Crimea, which was proclaimed an autonomous republic within Ukraine, Russian and Crimean-Tatar were declared the official languages, along with Ukrainian, which was declared the only official state language in all of Ukraine.

It is important to emphasize, that the political institutions of the former autonomies or newly organized republics insisted on the granting of the status of state language not only to the "republic" and to their "own" languages, but also to Russian, as a counterbalance to the governments of the previous Soviet republics, and now - sovereign states. It is precisely this last which leads to particularly sharp disharmony, for its retention as a state language signifies the upsetting of the primary goal of the new linguistic politics -the construction of national states of the titular nationalities, in which precisely the "republic" language everywhere fulfills all the primary functions of social life in the life of the new republics, and Russian is retained only as the language of one of the many ethnic minorities, used in "Russian" schools and in the daily life of the local Russian populations.

In 1991-1992 similar problems began to arise in a number of former autonomies, now sovereign republics of the Russian Federation, particularly in such as Tataria, Chechen-Ingushetia, and Tuva. Here, with the retention in the majority of cases of a formally equal status of Russian and the "titular" languages, the local governments undertake active efforts towards the sharp change of their actual functions. They aim to widen the spheres of use of the "republic" languages, accompanied by a parallel narrowing of the social functions of Russian. It is likely that the results of such linguistic politics will have results similar to those already having appeared in the former Soviet republics - a sharp intensification or even appearance of ethnic conflicts, due to linguistic causes,between the titular and nontitular population and, in some cases, to the secession of compact settlements of the non-titular nationalities.

The above noted transformation of cultural-linguistic elements of ethnic conflicts into political forms, does not entirely remove their importance. Ethnic culture and language as such continues to play an important role in the political confrontation of nationalities, even in those cases in which the struggle for power in the corresponding territory including the right to define its cultural-linguistic politics has already taken first place. Such a situation, clearly, will continue for the foreseeable future. The cardinal transformation of the cultural-linguistic environment in the former Soviet and some autonomous republics, and the adaptation of the entire multiethnic population to the new reality which is being formed today, inevitably will require many years and even decades.