PERSPECTIVES FOR ETHNIC ACCORD IN POST-SOVIET SPACE

Governing ethnicity at non-violent stage

For a number of post-Soviet states a promising strategy for reducing conflicting ethnicity is, as Donald Horowitz says, "proliferating the points of power so as to take the heart off a single focal point"(Horowitz, 1985:348). It could be done by decentralizing state power through territorial federalism. But there are important moments in the process of devolution of power from one centre in favor of federal units: what are the amounts and limits of shared power and what kind of political ideology lies behind these structures? In cases when internal units are proclaimed as "national" states it provides for two possibilities. One is to treat it as a right to exercise unlimited control over the subject's territory; another is to view this government as an exclusive "property" of a titular group because a "nation" in the post-Soviet context means "ethno-nation."

Another important step toward a renewed formula for post-Soviet federalism is a special status for republics among other members of a Federation. Being territorial units, republics could not be treated as only as administrative provinces or lands.They should keep their ethno-linguistic borders and specific cultural profiles. After providing equal rights for all citizens of republics, titular groups could establish its language and cultural institutions as a referent culture. But even this could be challenged by the rest of the population comprising quite often representatives of other groups which have legitimate claims to be treated as indigenous residents of the territory.

Federalism is a mean to make the institutions and services of the state closer to the needs and interests of culturally diverse groups living in one state. It is a mean to provide self-government for lower level authorities and for less spacious formations, which as a rule ethnically are more homogenous. Federalism is not a mean to implement the idea of "one ethnic group - one state."

Another strategy concerns the changing character of the power structures and the cultural realm to make the centre more ethnically mixed. The Russian Federation is still ruled by the representatives of the most numerous and culturally dominant group - the Russians. In the newly elected Russian parliament (State Duma) from 448 members 369 are Russians. How to make the federal centre multiethnic and raise the aspirations of non-Russians in the centre is a new challenge for democratic reforms. Meeting this challenge may minimize ethnic conflicts based on alienation or on rejection of the centre by non-dominant segments of society.

The process of political liberalization has brought a situation of real competition for access to powerful positions and privileges. The process of replacing the former system of nomenclature promotions has brought to power not only former dissidents and other democratic figures but also politicians who subscribed nationalist ideology and addressed ethnically defined electorate. The new leaders of post-Communist states as well as of many republics in Russia effectively use these opportunities and are able to bring to power "national cadres" to safeguard majority in representative institutions and administrative positions. For example, in Tatarstan all key positions in 59 administrative regions of the republic consist of 85 percent ethnic Tatars although they comprise about a half the population. Among appointed by the Supreme Soviet in October 1994 members of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan are all nine candidates - ethnic Tatars. In the republic of Adigea in Russia local nationals (29% of population) acquired assured control of top power in spite of thye fact that this republic was constitited from the terrotory of the Krasnodar Krai only three years ago in tiomes of libaralization (before it was an autonomous oblast).  

There is a need to develop and introduce special measures and programs, including quotas and affirmative actions to enlarge minorities representation in power structures and in a cultural realm of the state. There is a need in special measures for stimulating interethnic cooperation to reduce ethnic conflict, especially in political spheres. The most striking feature of post-Communist politics in all former union republics, and in most republics of Russia, is the primary role of ethnicity in forming political coalitions. Ethno-nationalism was the basis for collective actions and for mobilizing people with a totalitarian mentality who found themselves in a situation of crises. To dismantle or substitute this powerful harizmatic paradigm is not an easy task. Attempts should be made to introduce the practice of interethnic electoral and political coalitions and the limits for politicians to be promoted to positions of power on behalf of an ethnically defined electorate.

Multiethnic countries, as well as federal units like the Russian republics, should explore election procedures that guarantee a candidate be nominated and elected on condition of representing a multiethnic electorate. Interest group coalitions, including business, professional, and territorial associations, should be stimulated in multiethnic societies.

The most deep-rooted issue of interethnic relations - the question of reducing inequality and ethno-social disparity. Multiple historical, territorial, demographic and cultural factors influence real opportunities and positions of individuals and social groupings, including ethnic. This is a permanent challenge and conflict-generating characteristics of modern complex societies. In post-Communist world most of ethnic inequalities originate either from urban-rural and regional economic differences or from forceful actions of the state towards certain groups (Stalinist deportations, restrictions for ethnic and religious minorities, language assimmilation, etc.). Different losses are suffered by groups because of contacting more powerful cultural systems of more numerous nationalities.

The task of correcting striking inequalities should be made a major priority to reduce ethnic conflict and avoid open interethnic unrest. First, this should touch economy and resource management, especially in the situation of privatization and emerging market economy. It is usual that members of certain groups may play the role of major agents of industrialization, land exploration, and resource development like it were ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in projects such as gas and oil industries in Siberia, gold and diamonds in Yakutia, electronics and textile industries in the Baltics and Central Asia, and military installations in the republics of Chuvash and Tatarstan.

The paradox of the present situation is that those industries with predominantly Russian-speaking personnel provide major sources of GNP to territories (for example, 80% in Tatarstan and Yakutia, 70% in Latvia and Estonia) in which political power is controlled by non-Russians. So, along with a process of devolution and redistribution of political power, measures could be undertaken in the economic field: training of personnel and widening opportunities of high-skilled jobs for underrepresented groups, provisions for balanced interethnic participation in distributing shares of privatized enterprises, equal access to land sales, etc. Equally, it is important to provide more representations of Russian-speaking minorities in power structures of successor states besides Russia. There are rural enclaves with minorities displaying economic deprivation and where special assisting programs should be implemented.

The following mechanism concerns strengthening local self-government and community activities in governing grass-roots interests based on cultural distinctiveness. The role of community as a basic institution of social control and regulation in civic societies is drastically weak now. The Law on Local Self-Government passed by the Russian Parliament in 1991 was very abortive and reflected centralized political thinking and practice. At the same time it is evident that most of the disputed problems are local problems or at least may and could be resolved by local authorities.

There have been many cases in the recent years in which potential conflicts or the beginning of violence were regulated and stopped by local forces (committee for self-defence in Dushanbe, community leaders negotiating in the Northern Caucasus, local authorities activities to stop unlawful decisions of community meeting against ethnic aliens, etc.). Local governments should be provided with the authority and financial sources to implement their own initiatives and policy towards ethnic issues. They must have a right to make decisions on educational systems, including questions on language of instruction and teaching, on local broadcasting networks and press, on local official festivities, cultural symbols, etc. The variety and content of these kinds of activities are still very limited and poor in the territory of the former USSR.

For managing post-Communist ethnicity it is important to rehabilitate (after decades of severe Bolsheviks' criticism as "a bourgeois invention") the institute of exterritorial cultural autonomy. The self-determination could not be treated only as state or territorial definition with all its limitations imposed by existing political geography and systems. Self-determination today means an individual and group determining its own identity and safeguarding rights and interests based on this identity, irrespective of territorial status and political-administrative borders. Self-determination is a right to participate a wider political and cultural process.

For all countries of the area it is healthy to support and to provide an appropriate legal basis for activities of ethnic communities, including those directed toward native legislationand power representation, entrepreneurial and international activities. Ethnic communities and associations can execute a right for different forms of property, business and educational programs of any level, for mass communication facilities and for all kind of links with their cultural compatriots.

Transitional stage from tension to violence

Far not all ethnic tensions evolve a stage of unrest and violence but all opened conflicts precede tension and they have a short or long-term stage of escalation. Ethnic conflicts and wars which took place in a post-Communist world could be divided into two categories by the way how the violence was expressed. One type is riots and pogroms directed against ethnic foes - a short-term and grass-root expression of hatred and explosion of violence with a minimum of organized and structured activities. Another type is an opened conflict or a war with organized military or paramilitary forces on both conflicting sides and with a divided front-line and explicitly expressed positions and programs. Quite often riots evolve into protracted conflicts and the last ones may escalate into interstate wars.

There were pogrom-type conflicts in Uzbekistan (against Meskhetian Turks), in Azerbaidjan (against Armenians in Sumgait), in Osh, Kirgizia (between Kirgiz and Uzbeks), in Northern Ossetia, Russia (against Ingush), and in many other places, including cases of sporadic violence in large cities (like in Moscow against traders of the Caucasus region). At the moment there are few ongoing ethnic wars and opened conflicts in the area of the former Soviet Union: Karabakh and Abkhazia. Usually riots last days and very rarely over a week, opened conflicts may last for years. What kind of symptoms and actions precede violent stage and allow tension and disputes transform into unrest and clashes? Identifying it we can formulate a list of suggestion to avoid opened conflict at the pre-violent stage.

People react explosively not so the very fact of ethnically mixed population but the rapid changes caused by resettlement policy, spontaneous migrations, refugees influx, etc. Population movements, especially mass and unorganized, bring serious social problems (jobs competition, shortage of housing, criminal problems), violating accustomed order and a way of living. Local groups and authorities start to express fear and anxiety blaming newcomers, usually ethnic aliens, of old and new problems. Sometimes refugees and resettlers may be of the same ethnic stock (like Southern Ossets refugees from Georgia to North Ossetia or Russians moving from Central Asia and Baltics to central and southern part of Russia) but they bring different cultural values and mode of behaviour as well as negative feelings and hatred towards those from whom they had suffered.

Quite often newly emerged states enforce climate and politics of pushing out "non-native" population from places of their residence. Attempts, like settling of Kazakhs among Russians in Northern Kazakhstan, seriously aggravated existing status-quo in ethnic situation.

In a new geopolitical situation it is a sence to counteract the policy of forced change of the demographic situation, "to correct" it according new interstate borders. All tools of influence, including international ones, must be used to ensure basic legal equality for all those living in the new states, beginning with the acceptance of the "zero" variant of citizenship (all who lived on the territories of successor states at the moment of dissolution are eligible for citizenship). Migration policy must make it a priority to limit migration, to assist "new minorities" in their social accommodation and to integrate them into the recently changed political environment of the countries of where they reside.

The use of violence needs certain psychological preparedness especially for direct participants and executors of violent actions. Verbalization and propaganda of negative ethnic attitudes on a large-scale level usually plays this role and signalise a probability for unrest and physical violence. For months preceding pogroms press, politicians and local activists are spreading in implicit or in direct forms negative "images of others", including accusation of high criminality, too good living conditions, dishonest behaviour, uncivilized way of life, etc. It took place in many places of the FSU.

There are antiracist legislations exist in many countries forbidding public expression of race and ethnic prejudices and hate, especially when it may or did caused violent actions and crimes. The same kind of laws were passed in some ex-Communist countries. In spite of a large pool of clients subjecting legal prosecutions practically this type of legislation does not work. Rare attempts to organize a court case bring additional heat, tension, and mobilization of ethno-nationalistic elements in a society.

In spite of all difficulties, it deserves to provide state and public support as well as international judicial assistance to implement urgent measures against of disseminating ethnic hatred and prejudices, especially in areas of potential violence. To locate these places and to monitor the situation special national and regional network and services of ethnological monitoring and early warning should be established.

To execute a group violent act requires certain material preparations. Among them most important are making illegal structures in a form of para-military recruits ("guards", "popular armies", "volunteers", "security forces", etc.). Sometimes these formations are an initiative of regional or local authorities providing (over constitutional requirements) legal protection and material basis for that. It took place in Abkhazia, Triednestria, Nagorno Karabakh and in Northern Ossetia before the outbreak of violence and organized warfare. Sometimes structures and recruits for violence are organized or initiated by public associations and political parties of nationalist character as it took place in a case with Confederation of Mountainous Peoples in the Northern Caucasus.

This process has two significant components: acquiring arms and ammunition and hiring of and training "field commanders" and rank-and file warriors. It becomes possible in a situation of weakening central authorities and paralysing activities of judicial, police and security state institutions. For the post-Soviet space there are additional factors of the extremely powerful role of regular armies' personnel and of huge arsenal of weapons facilitating material preparation of ethnic violence. For the FSU the recent Afghanistan War has provided also a reservoir of young war professionals part of whom are psychologically damaged and socially disoriented in a contemporary situation.

In a situation of growing tensions and alienation measures strengthening public order and enforcing strict limitations on illegal acquiring and carrying of weapons and on establishing non-constitutional military structures are needed. The control over army arsenals should be severed, and any illegal arms sales and sponsoring or organizing military training for potential fighters among civilians should be persecuted. Special rehabilitating and supporting programs for young war veterans and people leaving reorganized security and military structures should be provided.

Obvious symptoms of the coming outbreak of violence are rising intolerance and provocative activities of ethnic entrepreneurs subscribing non-negotiable options for resolving conflicting issues. Sometimes they are successful in rising their demands on a level of official declarations and legal documents. Lacking experience and knowledge they inclined to read their concrete situation as an unique and abnormal one without world analogies and accumulated experience. Transitional stage is marked by psychologically and emotionally overloaded rhetoric of politicians, insulting political language and a lack of hearing any other arguments. Verbal warfare limits political contacts and push politicians and activists to extreme actions.

Another possible way of behaviour for leaders to pursue covered activities through intermediate forces. Usually it gets known sooner or later and quite often information on leaders and activists who chosen a path of confrontation is identifiable. Some of them even do not cover their choice in favour of violent solution and it is not difficult to make a list of active instigators and proponents of violence. It is much more difficult to find measures applied to neutralize or to change behaviour of those actors.

Sometimes at the pre-violent stage we can trace a paralysing and disoriented mode of behaviour of central authorities who may wish to avoid and resolve a dispute but lack experience and resources to do it. That is why important to pay a special attention to training and educating of leaders and local actors in conflict resolution approaches as well as in sharing information on similar situations in other regions of the world and what mistakes were committed. We do not exclude the use a psychologist's assistance for those individuals who emotionally obsessed with certain issues considering them as their own life destinies or chosen political mission.

Spontaneous or organized violent clashes is a prelude of big fighting. Street violence in urban settings is the event leading serious escalation. Weak reaction of authorities and public on sporadic clashes is usually interpreted as a green light for addressing large-scale violence towards ethnic foes.

In this situation least two major strategiesare possible: one is mobilization of local communities and public opinion against disturbing social peace actions, including establishing committees on grass-roots levels and watch groups monitoring situation in potentially dangerous areas; another is energetic actions on a part of police and court institutions to stop sporadic violence.

 Out of conflict

Going out of conflict is the most complex problem for experts and politicians. Confronting this difficult challenge some actors prefer fatalistic and demobilizing approach. Associating ethnic conflict with so-called "basic human needs" and the "fear of group extinction" one of specialists in conflict resolution surprisingly concluded that "so far there has been no solution to any major multi-cultural or multi-ethnic conflict. Ethnic and cultural conflicts persist and either become an on-going part of a social-political system, or erupt, leading to violence and the destruction of the system"(Burton, 1990: 33-34).

We cannot accept that vision of the problem because of many reasons. There were no conflicts, especially violent ones, which had lasted endlessly or were programmed by history and ethnicity itself. Even the most severe recent unrest on the territory of the former Soviet Union, like in Moldova and Central Asia had found different forms of resolving and governing. There are prospects for managing the situations in Azerbaidjan and Georgia, as well as in Tadjikistan. Modest but learning experience in transforming opened violence situation into peaceful one has already been accumulated for this area of the World. Enormous human and material resources are involved into peace-making efforts without being hostages of ambitious elites pretending to speak to behalf of "the people's will and interests".

For ethnic riots with pogroms and mass killing the situation is characterized by a lack of specially trained and effective military or legal forces. Typical cases are expulsion of Meskhetian Turks in Uzbekistan (spring 1989), Kyrgyz-Uzbeks conflict in Osh region (summer 1990), ethnic clashes in Fegrana (summer 1991). In this situation violence could be stopped by different ways, including its self-exhausting manner because of a fear of punishment and a lack of recruits. But in most cases it does not stop without interferences which may be of two kinds: forceful and other measures from the state and public interferences on a part of local community and other sectors. Energetic interference is crucial even when a violent case is gone because it gives a message against repeating violence and its further proliferation.

When a mob violence is outbroken an immediate reaction is needed, like strong public statements on behalf of authorities and energetic measures empowering police and other state forces to take a control of the situation, including introducing martial law or a status of emergency. Bringing non-local police forces may be a crucial element because of possible one-sided engagements and sentiments on a part of local servants. Retention, arrests and taking away from the fighting places of most active instigators and executors of violent acts are important elements for enforcing order.

Protracted and structured violent events transformed into organized war-type activities could be stopped by two kind of interferences in case conflicting sides can not reach mutual agreement by their own means or to win the war by force. Ones are political measures providing conditions and assisting in negotiations to reach cease-fire and peace agreements. For these purposes it is needed an urgent expertise and carefully designed measures to structure a process of dialogue and negotiations defining legitimate forces and individuals among conflicting parties or communities, selecting skilful mediators on both sides and acceptable negotiating place, providing security and confidentiality for a process of dialogue.

Cease-fire or peace agreements are relatively easy to reach then to establish mechanisms and guarantees to observe it for a lasting period. Many agreements has been reached during a war around Nagorno-Karabakh and in Abkhazia but most of them were short-lived and often used for accumulating new resources to resume military operations. It is important to pay attention to as conditions of cease-fire as well as to mechanisms and resources for implementing these conditions. Responsibilities of signatories, respectful repositories, sanctions for violation of agreement, observatory forces and their obligations and facilities are all these elements should be included in a process of dialogue.

Another form of interference to stop fire and to enforce peace is a third party intervention. In many respects it is a last resort to halt mass destructions and deadly wars and it may have a lot of unpredictable consequences in spite its growing popularity in an international arena, including UN structures. The third party interference proved be successful in cases when it was done at the consent and with participation of the both conflicting sides as it took a place in May 1992 in the Southern Ossetia. The introduction of three-partied military forces with the Russian army participation helped to stop three-years armed conflict and to transform in into low-level form. The main problem with the third party is to safeguard a neutrality of the outside force and avoid direct allaying with one side in a conflict. It took place, for example, with the Russian army in Abkhazia when it practically sided with local separatists and played a role in transforming a conflict into protracted war.

Outside forceful interference, including joint efforts on an international arena could be used only when political peace-keeping technique has been exghousted or when confronting parties request or agree for such an interference. Introduction and use of outside force could be arranged as a joint action with participation of the fighting forces agreed to monitor a cease-fire and establishing peace. Win-war and large-scaled operations on a part of outsiders should not be practised in areas of ethnic conflicts and internal wars because a situation may easily evolve into guerrilla-style war or local hatreds and distrusts may be overpassed by resistance mobilization against of "outsiders".

When a riot-type violence is stopped security measures should include steps against its possible repeating or spreading onto another places. Urgent measures are needed to prevent continuing violence in covered forms and secluded places as well as releasing all hostages on "all to all" basis. Police and troops in case of Emergency Law as well temporal administration imposed by higher level authorities are usually in a difficult situation of "newcomers" and quite often demonstrate incompetence and unpreparedness for inordinacy actions, or could be easily involved into "local diplomacy" and into false forms of solidarity. That is what happened to representatives of the Russian government and of the military commanders when they had arrived into a zone of Ingush-Ossetian conflict in November 1992.

Strong instructions for delegates of outside or above powers to disassociate themselves any conflicting side before proper investigations and judgement would be done and not to allow themselves to be influenced by local propaganda and other pressures. Establishing "direct rule" for stopping violence is useful only under condition of neutrality and of independent from the locals resources allocated by the central government or by other outside bodies.

In open conflict there are usually two sides but may be many actors claiming its own power, position and participation. The tragedy of internal feuds based on ethnic and clans loyalties in Tadjikistan is in incapabilities of state forces, including Russia's military and diplomacy to contact and negotiate with local field commanders. Non-obedience of separate paramilitary groups is a disturbing factor in all violent conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Many times it was a main reason for breaking peace and resuming fighting. That is why at this stage of conflict transformation it is important to establish contacts with potential intruders into peace process who are not at the top of negotiation list but who possess arms and recruits capable to ruin armistice and to challenge agreements.

Disarming in immediate war zones is much harder issue because of technical(it needs more time and resources), political(arms became a part of political capital and legitimacy), and psychological(people used to live with it and it is an element of heroization) reasons. Arms are also personal investments and people don't want to loose what they paid. There were different strategies used to take arms away civilians, in most cases it were unsuccessful: practically all weaponry arsenals were kept by local population in Southern Ossetia, Abkhazia, TriDnistria conflict zones. At the same time no strong measures were taken to meet the problem. We recommend to use a combined method of buying out gun and other deadly weapons with setting deadline time and sanctions.

Most of conflicts do not reach goals pursued by ethnic entrepreneurs: refugees are going home back, territorial and political status changes are not accepted by more powerful actors. Restoring status-quo is unhappy for fighters but often the only acceptable and realistic formula to follow for going out of violent stage. But status-quo means for such basic things as personal and job security, return to places of residence and giving back of the ceased property, restoration of state and civic institutions. For the rest out of conflict stage is a moment of serious structural changes towards better system of governing conflicting society or community. That is a moment when a society can get rewards from previous losses and destructions as well as to build mechanisms preventing possible conflicts in future.

We recommend to stimulate a change of political leadership allowing to take power positions for those who were not so heavily engaged into a violent stage and who do not carry direct responsibilities for political fallacies and for committed crimes. This recommendation goes against of usual practice when militant activists and politicians get wider support then they could be able to enjoy before starting mass mobilization around conflict-generating projects. Violence legitimizes political leaders and often makes them heroes. But without changing major actors it is hard to start a new play. Mass media, political opposition, international pressure and direct orders could be used to meet this recommendation.

Serious political discussions, public debates and legal measures should follow the after-violent stage to give people a feeling and a belief in mutually positive changes. Most of what we recommended for the conflict-preventive stage could be tested in this case too. A new and a very important element is a problem of legal investigations and of punishing criminals. So far there were no any serious trials (except of Osh conflict) of committed crimes in ethnic violence happened for the recent years in ex-Communist World that does not mean it is a wishful thinking and a hopeless enterprise. Anavoidance of punishment for criminal actions should be a basic attitude towards conflict resolution issues. Investigations should be effective in time-span and in expressed forms. Unpunished criminals is an invitation for a new violence and other forms of irresponsible behaviour.

Any conflict is a giant trauma on collective and individual levels, even for a victorious part in case such an exist. First, it is associated with tragedies of those who have lost family members and friends and suffered other kind of personal losses. For riot conflicts which are short-lived and may cause large and immediate number of deaths it is a major problem to go through a period of burial ceremonies and mourning procedures providing for this proper conditions and a receptive public climate. Those who were buried not in cemeteries during fighting because of blockade, sieges or other reasons should be reburied to avoid in future a sacralization of trauma and of an everyday message about past hatreds and sufferings as it took place in Southern Ossetia with a cemetary placed in a local school's yard.

Urgent measures for freeing hostages, finding lost persons and returning those who had left their places are needed not to give chances to perpetuate a situation of cleansing and provoke exaggerated information on a number of casualties during a conflict. In most cases on the territory of the former Soviet Union it was impossible to return refugees and expelled people to their old places (Azeris in Armenia, Armenians in Azerbaidjan, Turks in Uzbekistan, Ingush in Northern Ossetia, Georgians in Abkhazia). The reasons are a fear and lost properties but more often it is illegal usurpation of land plots, houses and apartments present behind cases of expulsion. There is a need to pass national laws or decrees as well as international declarations on illegality and criminal character of taking individual properties under situation of mass unrest and armed internal conflicts to build a proper basis for rewarding suffered people and to outlaw desires to gain from the conflict.

Medical treatments for wounded persons should be provided through local, national and international resources and structures as well as supply of medical help for displaced persons with properly protected personnel and treating places.

There are two kinds of victims which need special and delicate healing: parentless children and raped women. Situation with raped women, especially in less-modernised societies often could confront victims double "punishment" in this case on a part of their own communities and family members. We recommend a combination of psychiatrical help for victimized persons with educational efforts of specialists among local communities and family members.

It is crucial for this stage to develop mass media programs on dismantling wide-spread hatred and negative stereotypes among conflicting communities and on mobilizing people for constructive behaviour and projects. As it was observed in many after-conflict situations, people can not return to a normal life or start restoring works without external assistance and without providing proper social environment connected with feelings of safety, hope and support. But the main strategy for healing trauma that it self-organization and empowering local communities and leaders to take major responsibilities.

Ethnic riots and wars severely damage civic economy and life-subsistance mechanisms. Small factions of society acquire invested interests in militarized economy, a number of individuals and groups may profit from riots and unrest by doing their black market business in a situation of disorder. Major infrastructures could be destroyed or paralysed. Conflict area is usually desolated by successful entrepreneurs and not desirable place for new investments. That is why so hard to restore what was destroyed. There are few consequent measures should be undertaken to provide basic human requirements and to avoid epidemics or of new exodus. Popular estimates tend to exaggerate scales of damages. In urban environment it is usually glass, roofs, water and heating needed to start living in abandoned or severely damaged places. Then come energy and communication systems and basic food supplies.

All interested actors can use a situation of crisis for implementing development projects in areas of conflict. They are more often used to be less privileged zones and regions and need development and improvements. Openly discussed, widely acclaimed and properly supported development programs could bring enthusiasm and cooperative spirit for the former ethnic foes and rivals and will produce results which people cherish and afraid to loose. Local initiatives are crucial for development activities.

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References:

Burton, John and Frank Dukes, eds., 1990. Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution. New York: St. Martin's Press and London: Macmillan.

Yeltzin, Boris, 1994. "Federalism i mezhnatsional'noe soglasie" in "Ob Ukreplenii Rossiskogo gosudarstva" - Rossiskaia gazeta, February 25, p.4.

Nash, Manning, 1990. The Cauldron of Ethnicity in the Modern World. Chigago: Chicago University Press.

Horowitz, Donald, 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkley: Berklley University Press.