TERRITORIES, RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT

In defence of nation’s wealth and potentials

            In the former Soviet Union control of the environment or possibility to influence its life-sustaining components, were concentrated, to a greater or lesser degree, in the central political institutions. On a local level development activities were either objectively tied or subjectively (at the level of mass consciousness) associated with the interests of “outsiders”, or of other nationalities. Thus, problems of the resource use and environmental conditions could easily find projections into domain of interethnic relations generating ethnic conflicts. The ethnic actors and initiators of these conflicting issues are usually aiming for the redistribution of acees to resources to their own group advantages or to their own personal interests.

            Ethnic conflicts concerning the territorial borders of a habitat, originating in modern industrial society or involving nationalities with historically similar economic-cultural structures quickly acquire the meaning of a battle for real power over the disputed territory. In this situation the aspiration to political power becomes self-sufficing, and this power, like the conflict itself, takes on a marked prestige-symbolic character in the eyes of the participants. The question of the role of natural resources of the shared territory in the sustenance of the rival sides, if it does not disappear entirely, moves far from the focus of attention. Clearly, the underlying ecological causes of conflicts is not essential from the very beginning, for already in the very process of development of a conflict it is transformed into a purely political or economic manifestation.

            Events in Estonia may be looked at as an example of this process. Edgar Savesaar, one of the future leaders of the National Front of Estonia and subsequent leader of independent Estonia, announced in 1988 that "our nation received its first experience of mass organization in the action aimed against the mining of phosphates" (National Congress, 1989 : 20). In this manner, the ethno-national Estonian movement, later formed as the National Front, began challenge to the plans of Union Central Ministries to mine significant areas of Estonia for phosphorus. In its origin, therefore, it was a protest against the removal of part of the republic's territory to the control of Union, that is non-Estonian, organs of power. It was, in any case, thus perceived by Estonian society. However, this original ecological cause for conflict between Soviet government structures and the still forming ethno-national movement quickly led to the realization and formation of other demands: political (whether the right to manage the territory and natural resources of Estonia belonged to the Center or to republican organs of power), economic (whether the mining of phosphates developed the economic interests of the Estonian republic) and demographic (whether the introduction of the new workers, primarily Russians, which would be necessary for the mining of phosphates corresponded to the interests of Estonians and their republic). Accordingly, the environmental factor in the conflict, that is the question of the control of the Estonian environment, quickly ceded priority to the beginning conflict of the Estonian ethno-national movement with the Soviet government and began to be perceived as a primarily political and economic conflict.

            The events surrounding the plans to mine phosphurs in the region of the city of Rakver instantly achieved resonance throughout Estonia, all the more so because the site is located in the northeast of the republic, where the Russian population strongly dominates in the industrial centers. However, a very similar situation arose in the purely Estonian region near the city Valg, where not the Centre, but republic organizations initiated the construction of a large oil product repository. In the case of an accident this could have led to large-scale pollution of the Byaik-Emaiyg rivers and Vyrts'jarnb lake, located in the very center of Estonia. In the words of Tijta Vjaxi, "it can be said that the battle against the repository in Viraske laid the ground for the Valgask National Front. In the course of a few days several thousand people rallied around the idea of a protest" (National Congress, 1989 : 144). In this manner, the fight for the ecological interests of the local Estonian population acquired the character pf a statement in defense of its ethnic interests. These actions gave experience in mass mobilization and became primarily ethno-national movements even in situations, in which the government of the Estonian republic stood on the opposing side. Simply in this case, the latter was perceived as conductor and defender of the plans of the central government, the more so as the unrealized plans to build the oil product repository actually were negatiated and approved in Moscow.

Contacting territories and sharing resources

            Ethnic conflicts take on an entirely different character when related to territorial borders of a habitat, when the rivals are the pover institutions of a modern industrial developed state and ethno-national movements of nationalities which still lead a traditional mode of life, a preagrarian stage of social evolution. In this case ecological factors not only generate conflicts, but also define their further development. Such situations occur in settlements of small-numbered peoples of the North and Siberia, as well as large nationalities (e.g. Yakuts and Buryats) and Russian auctochtons (old settlers) of Siberia, whose economy to this day is, to a significant degree, founded on deer breeding, fishing and hunting. Here industrial development of mineral deposits, the building of hydro-electric dams, oil and gas pipelines, railways and highways, leads to confiscation of significant hunting, fishing and herding grounds from the local population. In many cases, this not only sharply weakens the possibilities of their traditional economic activities, but makes the very preservation of the primary systems of livelihood and cultural continuity impossible. This puts entire ethnic groups and separate communities in danger of disappearing due to assimilation into the industrial settlements and cities appearing on their territories.

            Collisions on this ground become ethnic conflicts even in polyethnic regions -- ethno-national movements of local nationalities unite in their opposition to Soviet or Russian governmental structures and recent arrivals generally heading regional and local economic structures and undertakings. For example, in the Vilyue region of Yakutsk live 200 thousand people: 47% are Yakutsk, 39% are Russian (old scttlers) and .4% Evens. The development of hydropower projects and mineral mining undermined fishing in the Vilyui river and some of its tributaries, and severely curtailed hunting possibilities. Thus, the rising movement for protection of the environment (that is, against the negative consequences of industrial development) acquired the character of a conflict between the indigenous population and newcomers. In a 1991 sociological surney, 25% of Russians, 27% of Yakuts, and 16% of Evens named the deterioration of the ecological situation as the major cause of the inter-ethnic tensions (Maksimov, 1991 : 93). A similar situation has developed in other regions of Yakutsk. Thus, ecological causes served as one of the main reasons for the fermenting of an ethno-national Yakutsk region.

            The "Appeal of Native Inhabitants to the Session of the All-Union Congress of Peoples Deputies" serves as a good illustration of this situation. The Appeal was composed by the Association of Nationalities of the North Kamchatka Region, which led a successful drive to gather signatures to the Appeal. It reads (cit. from: Murashko, 1992 : 5):

            "We the native peoples of Kamchatka: Koryaks, Evens, Chukcha, Itel'men, Kamchadal (Russian-speaking descendants of mixed marriages of Russians with Itel'men and Koryaks in the 18th century--V.T.), strongly object to the development of a gold-mining industry in our region. The mining of gold and other raw materials will turn our region into an uninhabitable scrap of land. Deer pastures, spawning rivers, hunting grounds will all be destroyed. And this means that the traditional economic livelihood of the native population will fall into decline. With the disappearance of our traditional livelihood, will disappear our national cultures and native tongues. Without our traditional livelihoods the indigenous nationalities of Kamchatka will disappear."

            Ethnic conflicts related to territory and environment have a particular character in those regions in which the forced agricultural collectivization at the beginning of the 1930s and the forceful transfer of nomadic People to a sedentary way of life took place. Within the boundaries of one and the same relatively small territory often existed 2 or more ethnic groups with differing economic-cultural structures and using varying natural resources of this territory. Such situations can be found in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Kazakhstan and South Siberia, where agricultural and nomadic or pastural herding groups occupied various niches within one region. For example, in the Central Asian-Kazakhstan region, the seasonal routes of nomads, in part Kirghiz and Kazakhs went from the plains to the mountains through the foothills and river valleys settled by agricultural nationalities (Uzbeks, Sartams, and from the end of the 19th c. Uigurs, Russians, Dungans), where together with arable lands were the pastures and watering-places essential to herders. In such conditions, one region was essential to the existence of both agriculturalists and nomads. Both groups realized this and therefore considered such territories, with their mosaics of agrarian ugor'jami?? and water sources, their own.

            The national - state administrative demarcations, introduced by the Soviets in order to create "national republics," by their very nature could not reflect the complex picture of land and water-use of the regions's nationalities. Thus, the creation of republic borders divided similar territories and caused the appearance of the environmental preconditions for ethnic conflicts long before the realization of the industrial programs. Today these preconditions manifest themselves in a dual manner.

            Firstly, in some places of historical contact between settled agrarian and nomadic herding groups, direct conflicts over concrete parcels of land and water sources have continued. The presentation of the Tadzhikistan delegate G. Savridzinov before the 28th Communist Party Congress is an example of this. To this day, unregulated land arguments continue between the Takzhiks of the Isfarinsky region of Takzhikistan (a long-settled agricultural population of this part of the Fergansky valley) and the Kirghiz (previously nomadic herders) of the Batken region of Osh region. There is no mutually agreed border between these regions and, correspondingly, between Tadzhikistan and Kirgizia. In 1989 this conflict poured forth into direct clashes with human losses, but an Martial Law was effectively implemented and order restored. As an resolution of the situation, along with the hope to achieve an understanding regarding the demarcation of this part of the border, the creation of a special economic zone and joint agricultural and industrial ventures in the disputed area and bordering regions of both republics was proposed (28th Party Congress, 1990 : 105-06).

            This Tadzhik-Kirghiz conflict has flared up several times in recent years: in 1982, 1988, 1989 (when events received the greatest resonance) and in 1991 (Bushkov 1990:1; Abashin and Bushkov 1991:2). The valley of the Isfara river serves as the epicenter of the arguments over land and water. A large part of it was included in Tadzhikistan, in the form of an enclave at the ancient village of Vorux, surrounded by the territory of Kirgizia. In this locality, the waters of the Isfara have long been considered Tadjik, as are those parts of the river valley which were cultivated and irrigated by the Tadjiks in the 19th century and earlier times. However, in the Isfara valley was mush fallow land on which, also according to tradition, the nomadic Kirgiz wintered with their herds. In this very place of regular yearly winter pastures and stopovers, appeared permanent Kirgiz settlements in the middle of the 19th century, in which the Kirgiz also turned to agriculture, channeling water from the river to their fields. The Kirgiz entirely justifiably consider these lands, which they simply began to use not only for herding, but also for agriculture, "theirs." And in addition they now officially belong to the Kirgiz republic. But, in the view of the Tadjiks, all cultivated land and land suitable for cultivation, and the waters of the Isfara -- is historically their land and, most important, their water. In their eyes, the Kirgiz are violators of ancient local customs of land- and water-use, taking away the farmers'.

            The intensification of interethnic unrest over land and water is aggravated by a very high rate of population increase and obvious rural overpopulation, particularly in Tadjikistan. The population of the Isfara district of Tadjikistan, at this time 75% Tadjik and 6% Kirgiz, from 1970 - 1990 has increased 12.7 times. In the neighboring Batken region of Kirgizia, where Kirgiz strongly dominate, it has increased only 2.5 times in the period 1964 - 1990 (Bushkov 1990 : 4-5, 7-9).

            Ethnic collisions close both in their essence and the significance of ecological factors in their appearance, also take place in more western parts of Tadjikistan, also along the Fergana valley and its foothills. There the competitors for land and water resources are traditional Tadjik farmers living within the borders of Tadjikistan, and the descendants of nomadic and semi‑nomadic Turkish tribal-clan groups, now under the control of Uzbekistan (Abashin and Bushkov 1991: 8-9, 11-12).

            However, such a direct and manifestation of ecological factors in ethnic conflicts is more often than not an exception. Much more common is an indirect influence of the problem of territorial borders and natural resources in areas formerly settled by both nomadic herders and sedentary farmers. In these cases this factor tightly intertwines with historic and economic forces, but nonetheless continues to play its role as the problem of preservation of access to life sustaining natural resources which prove to be on the territory of a neighboring republic (now another state).

            The situations in the East Trans‑caucasus (the Armenian-Azerbaidjan conflict in Nagorny-Karabakh) and in the Fergana valley (the Uzbek-Kirgiz conflict in the Osh region of Kirgizia) can be seen as examples of this. In Trans‑caucasus the borders of republics and autonomous regions trans‑versed ancient routes of the Azerbaidjani nomadic herders between winter plains and summer mountain pastures. The summer mountain pastures of Karabakh mountain plateaus (Kel'badzhar and Lachin regions of Azerbaidjan, separating Nagorny Karabakh from Armenia), and the Karabakh and Murovdag ranges (western and northern borders of Nagorny Karabakh) were traditionally used by Azerbaidjani herders, moving for winter to the Mil'sko-Karabakh steppe (plains of Azerbaidjan - Agdam, Agdzhabedin and others, located between Nagorny Karabakh, and the Kura and Araks rivers). Almost all nomadic routes transversed the territory of the modern-day Nagorny-Karabakh autonomous region. Some of the Azerbaidjan herders spent the warm seasons in the mountainous zones of modern-day Nagorny Karabakh. The fransition of the last Azerbaidjani nomads to a sedentary mode of life in the plains regions of the Milo-Karabakh steppe at the beginning of the 1930s did not change the nature of animal husbandry; it remained primarily a branch of agriculture, based on  the year-round pasturing of livestock: summer in the mountain pastures-- yailogs, winter on the plain pastures--kishlags.

Right up until the beginning of armed actovities in Nagorny-Karabakh, Azerbaidjani “chabans”, according to tradition, accompanied by their wives and children, every spring and fall cut through the territory of Nagorny-Karabakh with the kolkhoz herds. Some of them spent all summer in the high mountains of the autonomous region. The chabans, like their fellow villagers, kept their family livestock in addition to the collective herds. In this manner, for them, access to the mountainous summer pastures, including those in the adminstrative territory of Nagorny-Karabakh, and use of the traditional herding routes leading throughout this region, signified the possibility of protection of the very foundation of their economics and livelihood. Therefore, the problems of territorial boundaries of habitat played a primary role in the formation of the position of Azerbaidjanis from the border regions between Azerbaijdian and Nagorny-Karabakh. It was they who most actively spoke out against the joining of the autonomous region to Armenia.

            In the Osh region of Kirgizia republic borders were patterned differently; and the majority of both summer mountain and winter plains-foothills pastures of Kirgiz nomads fell under the authority of Kirgizia. However, some of the Kirgiz settled in the region of winter plains pastures, which turned out to be on the territory of the neighboring Andizhan region of Uzbekistan (of a population of 1.7 million in 1989 Uzbeks comprised 88%, Kirgiz 4%). But the main problem lies not in this, but in a similar decision which led to the inclusion of considerable foothill regions into the Osh region of Kirgizia. In  1989, of a population of 2 million people Kirgiz constituted 60%, Uzbeks 27% (USSR Census 1989: 94, 128). Herding stock-raising with year-round rotation of livestock to summer mountain and winter plains-foothills pastures is also preserved. As before, it comprises the economic foundation of many, if not the majority, of Kirgiz. Therefore, even the first attempts to begin a movement to create a territorial autonomy for Uzbek areas of the Osh region met with sharp counteractions by the Kirgiz, for this was viewed as a threat to complicate, or even make impossible, access to the winter pastures, located in historically Uzbek settlements or in locations, to which the route led through Uzbek regions. In this manner, here the territorial-resourse factor, as a question of geographical frontiers of habitat also played a major role in the formation of Uzbek-Kirgiz ethnic conflict, which, however, was generated by an whole complex of factors, including socio-economic, and psychological political.

            Finally, we can trace one more example of a similar collision from the steppe plains of North Caucasus, between the Terek and Kura rivers. Nogai nomadic herders have lived here since the 15th century. In the Russian Empire this territory composed a separate administrative unit--the "Nogai Steppe." Later, under Soviet regime, this territory continued to be treated as a unit under larger administrative formations. At the beginning of 1957 however, after the restoration of the Chechen-Ingush republic and the return of Ingush and Chechens from exile in Kazakhstan, the Nogai Steppe, together with the Terek river valley settled by descendants of Russian Cossacks, was divided into three unequal parts. The smallest was included in the Stavropol region, the other two into Chechen-Ingushetia and Dagestan. One of the major reasons for such a decision was the desire to improve the conditions for the development of traditional semi-nomadic stock-breeding in the region, particularly in connection with the return of the Chechens to their native mountains and the necessity to revive their economy. Even before the revolution the Nogais regularly rented their land as winter pastures to their neighbors: Russian peasants and Cossacks, Chechens and Dagestan mountain dwellers -- Avars and Dargins. In the summer the mountain shepherds kept their livestock in the mountain pastures of the Great Caucasus Range and its spurs. Kolkhozes continued this tradition in the Soviet period, all the more so since the forced settling of the Nogais during collectivization considerable lessened the dimensions of their stockbreeding economy and, consequently, need for pastures.

            New arrivals predatorily used the pastures of the Nogai steppe, leading to their desertification, as was already observed at the beginning of this century (Yamskov 1986: 27-29). During the Soviet period the overuse of pasturelands increased still further, and the desertification of the Nogai steppe acquired particularly worrying scales. Furthermore, in recent decades the resettling of mountain peoples and Russians in the Nogai steppe began, and in many places the Nogai have become a minority. What is more, mountain herders, particularly the Dargins, began to squeeze gradually the Nogai out of the stockbreeding on sovkhozes and kolkhozes of the Nogai steppe (Kalinovskaya and Markov 1990: 10-11). Naturally, these processes strongly distressed the Nogai. Nogai poet K. Kumratova very clearly and vividly described the nature of this dissatisfaction: "Steppe singers sing of the desecrated steppe. Bureaucracy renamed the Nogai steppe the Kizlyar pastures. There are no people here, and they use the land for livestock..."(Polovetskaya luna 1991 : 15-16).

            Thus, one of the chief causes of the development of a Nogai ethno-national movement is ecological; it is a question of the territorial resources and habitat borders. Now, however, political reasons occupy first place -- the battle for territorial autonomy. But ecological causes, as before, are not forgotten.

The quality of habitat facing disaster

            Ecological factors of conflicts related to the quality of habitat deserve careful attention. Ethnic conflicts of this sort provoke the exhaustion of planetary resources or their pollution as a result of the actions of supranational agents -- governments, organizations, immigrant groups. As is well‑known, the balance of the global ecology is particularly clearly shown at the local level. This means that serious damage, committed to one of the components of a defined territory, worsens the condition of this component in neighboring territories settled by other nationalities, and thus seriously complicating or undermining their life subsistance systems.

            The problem of the exhaustion of natural resources dur to their extreme exploitation on the territory of neighboring nationalities is particularly visible in the Central Asia-Kazakhstan region (Kara‑Kalpakia and the Arals regions of Kazakhstan) in regards to water, and in Siberia and the north of Russia as regards hunting and fishing. Pollution of the environment plays no less important a role in industrial society. It usually strongly complicates the lives not only of those living near the sources of pollution, but also those at a greater distance, to which harmful substances penetrate. Examples of such components of the global resourses as water (the lower reaches of the Amu‑Dariya in Kara‑Kalpakia) and air (the regions of the Fergana valley of Uzbekistan located to the northeast of the Isfarin aluminum plant in Tadjikistan) clearly illustrate this phenomenon. In part, the events of the first half of 1989 in the regions of the Fergana regions of Uzbekistan bordering Tadjikistan, serve as a convincing example of the role of ecological causes in the appearance of ethnic conflict due to the transfer of air-borne pollutants. Here, the rural Uzbek population became concerned and attempts were even made to plan protest marches and demonstrations in neighboring Tadjikistan, with the demand to cease the omission of pollutants into the air at the Isfarin plant.

            The Uzbek population accused the Tadjik government and the plant’s managers that pollutants which fell into the water and soil of nearby Uzbek villages lead to an increase in infant mortality and birth defects and a general increase in morbidity and mortality rate of the population. The authorities were forced to declare an emergency situation in the border zone and sent special regiments there.

            However, a more tragic example of the influence of an ecological crisis on an ethnic situation is the Aral Sea region. The development of irrigation farming, in particular cotton-growing, in the Amu‑Dariya (Uzbekistan and Turkmenia) and Syr‑Dariya (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) river basins led to the situation that very little water flows into the lower basins of these rivers at their entry into the Aral Sea. However, the concentration of dangerous chemical substances (pesticides, defoliants, mineral fertilizers) greatly increases in this area. This has placed the population of the lower reaches of the both rivers, forced to use water for drinking and irrigating fields and gardens, a way dangerous for health. The ecological catastrophe of Aral Sea region received great attention and leaders of the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan promised, with joint efforts and the assistance of other republics of the Soviet Union, to do all that is possible for the resolution of this problem (Statement... 1990: 57).

     The most difficult situation developed in the Kara‑Kalpak autonomous republic, located in Uzbekistan on the delta of the Amu‑Dariya river and on the southern littoral of the rapidly evaporating Aral Sea, in which only 30% of the original volume of water remains. In 1989 1.2 million people lived there, of whom 32% were Kara‑Kalpaks, 33% Uzbeks, 26% Cossacks (USSR Census... 1991: 92). According to S. Nietullaev, former First Secretary of the Kara-Kalpak Communist Party, approximately 70% of the adult population and 60% of the children in the autonomous republic were sick (28th Congress...., 1990: 95-96). Infant mortality here is 53%, as compared to an average in Uzbekistan of 38%, and in the ecologically relatively fortunate Tashkent region (without the city of Tashkent) -- 31% (Demographic... 1990:135).

     The gravity of the situation in the autonomous republic regarding health is shown in the age structure of the population: inhabitants over 60 years old make up only 3.3% of the population of Kara-Kalpakia (according to S. Nietullaev -- see above), but in 1970 in the Soviet Union as a whole 11.9% and in Uzbekistan as a whole 8.7% (Bruk 1981 : 204). This almost three times difference between Kara-Kalpak and Uzbekistan must be looked at against the background of relatively similar birthrates -- 35% and 33% respectively (calcuated from: Demographic... 1990: 11,135). However, such obvious ecological preconditions for serious political conflict have not led to mass public actions and protests of the local population, much less to the appearance of interethnic conflicts. This latter is partly due to the multiethnic composition of the Kara‑Kalpakia population. To speak of the formation of an ethno-national Karakalpak movement can only be conditional, because for now it consists only of a few local writers and journalists publishing on ecological and historical-cultural problems. It is possible that the answer to this questions is contained in this statement by the Kara‑Kalpak writer T. Kaipbergenov: "All the strength of the nation is focussed on one thing -- survival. We aren't capable of anything: not anger, not the search for culprits. We think only of one thing: to survive, to save ourselves (Kaipbergenov 1990).

Politisized environmentalism

            Ecologic factors played a particular role in the formation and strengthening of ethno-national movements in Belorus and Ukraine. These movements from the beginning developed under the influence of cultural-linguistic causes, but precisely the battle with the after-effects of the Chernobyl catastrophe gave them mass support and influence. In part, the ethno-national movement in Belorus from the moments of its birth spoke out against plans to build the Daugavpils hydro-electric station in the bordering region of Latvia, which could have caused the flooding of parts of Belorus and worsened the ecological condition of the West Dvin river. The Latvian ethno-national movement first began to protest, and Belorussians actively supported them. At this point, in the spring of 1987, the Belorus ethno-national movement achieved mass suppost and first proclaimed itself an independent social force, capable of exercising a real influence on the political process. The movement achieved greater authority and scope in 1989, when the theme of Chernobyl acquired the leading place in its activities -- the struggle for full and accurate information and for reahbilitating measures of radiation contamination of the republic's territory (Tereshkovich 1991 : 157, 160).

            In this manner, the ethnic mobilization of the population and the appearance of mass ethno-national movements in Belorus, as in Ukraine, to a great extent took place under the influence of ecological factors, calling forth the dissatisfaction and protest of the republics's inhabitants. The Union center as intiator of the construction of the Chernobyl nuclear and Daugavpils hydro-electric plants and, most importantly, as the culprit in concealing accurate information about the regions and level of radioactive contamination after the Chernobyl accident, standed as the opponent of these movements, that is as the competing side in the conflicts. However, ethno-national movements of Belorussians and Ukrainians did not acquire a distinctly anti-Russian character, at least not up until 1991. This could be explained by the active participation of Russians, both those living in the republics and in Russia, in protest groups against the Soviet government's cover actions on the true consequences of the accident. It is also explained by the leading role of Russian scientists, engineers, military and workers in the liquidation of the destruction and radioactive pollution in Chernobyl itself.

            Thus, we repeat, that ecological factors in ethnic conflicts of the former Soviet Union were quite deep and seved in the most of republics as the founding cause for the creation of the platform of mass social movements (Drobizheva 1991b : 69). It is significant that even in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaidjan, the first mass actions of ethno-national movements were called forth by ecological demands, at the least, existed among other demands at the birth of these movements (Abramyan and Marutyan 1991 : 37). No less significant is that in the Baltics as well as Transcaucasus, with the development of national movements their ecological motives either lost significance, or were transformed into other motives -- most often economic and political.

            Clearly, the conclusion can be reached that in industrially developed regions ecological factors often play a defining role at the initiate stage of ethno-national movements. However, with the growth of influence and mass participation in ethno-national movements, ecological demands find more defined forms of struggle for control over territory and resources.

            In the primarily agrarian regions of the former Soviet Union ecological and resourse factors in ethnic conflicts are, on the one hand, rarely the sole or primary factors leading to the growth of nationalist sentiments. On the other hand, their role, together with other causes, remains important in the evolution. of conflicting situations. It should also be added, that even very bad ecological conditions, and the dissatisfaction of the population with the situation in these regions do not always lead to political action or the rise of ethnic conflicts.

            In regions of the former Soviet Union, particularly in Russia, where nationalities with a traditional economic structure have been preserved, resembling a preagrarian stage of social evolution, questions of the environment, the condition of inhabited regions, access and control over resources - all become the greatest sources of conflict in the interrelations of ethnic groups. These problems retain their original meaning at all levels of the development of the conflict. In direct or implicit forms they projecting itself in the sphere of interpersonal relations, political struggle and intellectual battles.