THE RUSSIAN ARE LEAVING (CENTRAL ASIA)

After acquiring their independence unexpectedly with little, if any, preparation, the states of the Central Asian region (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) have entered a transitional period in their histories (1). This period is characterized by a search for new formulae and socio-political foundations of national development and for their own niche in the new geopolitical space. Inasmuch as the disintegration of the USSR took place under the slogan of the doctrine of ethnic nationalism, it is only natural that the proclamation of so-called "national states" within the borders of the former union republics should be made on behalf of the "titular" ethno-nations: the Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kirgiz, Turkmen and Tajiks.

These groups are mainly socio-cultural structures of the Soviet period. However, in the past 70 years they have undergone an extremely intensive process of "nation-building", with the regional, religious and dynastic-clan identities of the past giving way to a new ethnicity based on the concept of the "Socialist nation". This new ethnicity was closely bound to the "national-state delimitation" that was determined from above and the protracted sway of the republican party elite, or nomenklatura, through which the Union centre exercised its rigidly centralized rule in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The nation-building process was attended by radical changes: economic modernization, promotion of mass education and the establishment of prestigious institutions of "national statehood" based on a new powerful stratum - the administrative, creative and scientific-technical intelligentsia. Finally, the 1960s-1980s saw a noticeable shift of the demographic balance in favour of the "titular nations", which now became the majority in all states except Kazakhstan. (2)

It is precisely these "successes" of Soviet nationalities policy, and not just the crimes of the Soviet regime and the persisting centralization and ideological and cultural control of the Russian-speaking centre, that contributed to, in fact made possible, the powerful thrust of the Central Asian periphery toward national self-determination. Yet the old tenacious doctrine of ethno-nationalism incorporated in the Marxist-Leninist theory of nationalities and the nationalities question has also generated a major problem that the new post-Soviet states have to tackle in developing their statehood, namely the status and fate of the non-titular population, which is a sufficiently numerous component in these states (from 30 to 50%). Central to this problem is the fate of the Slav, primarily the Russian, population.

Demographic Background

According to the 1989 USSR census, the Russian population in the region numbered 9,500,000 and constituted 19.3 % of the overall population. Russians accounted for 21.5% of the population in Kirgizstan, 7.6% in Tajikistan, 8.4% in Uzbekistan, 37,8% in Kazakhstan and 9.5% in Turkmenistan. Most of the Russians were old-timers. Back in 1917 there were 1,500,000 Russians in the region making up almost ten per cent of the population of Turkestan. Slightly less than half of the Russians had settled in rural Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the rest were urban dwellers. The newcomers from Russia had played a major part in the development of agricultural production, in irrigation, and the expansion of arable land, in building railroads and towns, and in the emergence of heavy and mining industries. This was true especially regarding Northeastern Kazakhstan, which was part of Orenburg Gubernia and afterwards, up to 1936, part of the RSFSR.

Under Soviet rule, the influx of migrants from Russia increased, owing mainly to the Soviet government's doctrine of accelerated industrialization, in which the new-arrivals - specialists and workers - were largely instrumental.

Engineers and technicians, scientific and medical personnel, professionals in education and the arts (predominantly from Russia) arrived in the cities of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. In the 1930s, settlements of deported peasants from Russia and Ukraine were formed in different regions, mainly in Kazakhstan. During the Great Patriotic War, a great number of factories complete with personnel were evacuated to Central Asia. Ninety factories and about 1,000,000 people were moved to Uzbekistan alone. Many of those people stayed there after the war was over. In the postwar decades the stream of immigrants continued. In Uzbekistan, for instance, they accounted annually foreight-nine per cent of the urban population grown. (3) In large measure the influx to the cities and industrial regions was generated by extensive industrial and housing construction (especially in Tashkent) and the work-force recruiting campaign for the new industries. The 1950s also saw a mass resettlement in Kazakhstan's virgin lands of people from Russian rural areas (the Volga, Central Russia, Western Siberia).

It was only in the 1970s that the Russian population stopped growing. In the past two decades the absolute number of Russians and their share in the overall population have been steadily decreasing in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan (where in 1989 they accounted for from 7.6 to 9.5% of the population), whereas in Kazakhstan and Kirgizia they increased only slightly in absolute terms (comprising 37,8 and 21,5%, respectively). Compared with the 1960s, the migration balance for the five republics was clearly unfavourable in the 1980s (Table 1). According to the 1989 data, slightly less than half the Russians living in the region were born there (from 43.3 to 48.3% for different republics), and about 30% of the newcomers had lived there for more than ten years. (4)

The changes in the population pattern since the 1970s were primarily the result of the high birthrate of the "titular", as distinct from the European, population, particularly in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (where crisis symptoms generated by the uncontrolled population growth were discernible), the growing migration of people of local nationalities from the countryside to the cities, and the outflow of the Russian-speaking population from the region. The Russian rural population was dwindling the fastest: people were leaving for other parts of the USSR and for the region's industrial centres. Today, Russians and people of other European nationalities live mainly in the urban areas. The proportion of Russians who are urban dwellers varies from 70% in Kirgizstan and 77% in Kazakhstan, to 94-97% in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (as against 20.5%, 38,5%, 26.5%, 28%, and 34% of the titular population, respectively). Only in Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan is the proportion of Russians living in the countryside still considerable: approximately 20 and ten per cent in 1989.

The Socio-Economic Situation

When the USSR existed, the Russians in Central Asia and Kazakhstan were employed primarily in the development of industry and transport and urban construction. Their social and professional pattern is basically different from the employment pattern of people of the local nationalities. Indeed, traditionally, it was mostly Russians who worked in industry, transport, construction and communications where their share exceeded their proportion in the working population many times over. Among the intelligentsia they comprise the majority of the specialists in the technical field and in the exact sciences. (5) Only in Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan is the percentage of Russians employed in agriculture still high: they work mainly as machine operators and agricultural and animal husbandry specialists. People of the titular nationalities are predominantly employed in agriculture. In the cities, they work mostly in trade and the services; among white-collar workers they comprise the majority of managerial personnel, cultural workers and the professional intelligentsia (Table 2). According to the 1979 data, the share of Russians employed in industry ranged from 22.4 to 32.6% of the entire working population in Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, and in construction, from 12.2 to 18.2%. For the titular nationalities the respective figures were from 9.2 to 11.1% in industry and from 4.8 to 8.4% in construction. The proportion of Russians working in agriculture was 10.2% in Kirgizstan, and from 2.7 to 3.4% in the other republics, while the figures for the titular nationalities were from 52.6 to 56.9%. (6) According to the 1989 data, 22.4% of the Kazakh population and 52.6% of the Russian population of Kazakhstan were employed in industry. The share of Russians engaged in agriculture was steadily decreasing and in 1989 stood at 17.7% in Kazakhstan, 6.8% in Kirgizstan, 0.6% in Uzbekistan, and 0.7% in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. However, Russians accounted for, respectively, 20.4%, 13.9%, 4.2%, 5.9%, 3.9% of farm managers and agricultural specialists and 26.8%, 17.5%, 1.3%, 2.1% per cent, 2.2% of machine operators.(7)

The social and professional differentiation along ethnic lines was and remains greater than in other regions of the former USSR. On the one, hand, the local population is keeping within its traditional village-agrarian economy niche and, on the other, in the past few decades it made a dramatic breakthrough into the more prestigious spheres of management, public education, public health and law, and quite recently also into trade and commerce, light industry and urban services. The Russians have not expanded their social and professional profile in the 1990s but they have increased their share in the heavy industry work force and in the industrial and technical intelligentsia.

Even before the dramatic changes of the perestroika era began, then, the employment pattern of the Central Asian republics was marked by undercurrents of ethnic conflict and the "Russian problem" existed although it had not surfaced. It was reflected in a major way in the inadequate Russian representation both in the servicing spheres (teachers, doctors, lawyers, the non-scientific intelligentsia) and in the power structure, especially in the courts of law, the militia and republican and local level administration. The peculiarities of the Russians' social and professional composition, that previously made for their comparatively high living standard, have become definitely negative over the past few years, now that an economic-sectoral and production reorientation is under way in the republics: a reduction in heavy industry enterprises, including the military-industrial complex, a general crisis in government-subsidized spheres and an upsurge of commercial, broker and financial activity.

The Russians have been faced with the serious problem of finding a new niche in the changing economic and socio-cultural situation. The results of a sociological survey conducted in 1992 in Kirgizstan by staff of Moscow's Ethnology and Anthropology Institute show that the prospect of reorientation towards employment in the timber and food industries, in agriculture, trade and the services is acceptable to them. However, for the Russians to actually implement this reorientation, namely, to change their profession, sphere of activity and even forms of property (from state and co-operative to private) is no simple matter in this region of tenacious labour traditions. The Russians in Kirgiszstan who wish to work in trade and the services, as middlemen or in finance are three times as numerous as those already employed in these fields. Yet their prospects of "ousting" representatives of the titular nationality, who are even now predominant in these occupations and are desirous of increasing their representation in them in the future (Table 3), are dim indeed.

More active involvement of Russians in free enterprise could provide a partial solution to the problem. However, the prospects for such an involvement are limited as a result of insufficiently developed market relations, shortage of initial capital, which as a rule is accumulated illegally or in trade, coupled with misgivings regarding the status of Russians in the newly emerged states. According to the above-mentioned survey, only 16% of Russian urban dwellers in Kirgizstan would like to become owners of private enterprises, while the number of such people among the Kirgiz is twice as high. Many Russians are pessimistic about their chances of acquiring property in Kirgizstan (land or an enterprise in the sphere of production or in the service sector, a house, an apartment of shares) and nearly a quarter think that, given a future process of privatization, their chances are worse than those of the Kirgiz.

The situation is especially complicated for those of the Russian intelligentsia whose work involves contacts with the local population and use of the language of the titular nationality. Insufficient knowledge of the language of the titular nationality is a formidable obstacle for Russians working in public health, education, culture and office work and a principal argument in favour of their dismissal. Such a state of affairs may further reduce the already insignificant number of Russian teachers, doctors, lawyers, writers and journalists, which would be detrimental to the entire Russian-speaking population, including people of the titular nationalities close to Russian culture.

A resurgence of Muslim traditions in some of the Central Asian countries instils in the younger generation and introduces into everyday culture and the arts, traditions which are far removed from European canons, and will only complicate the activities of Russian educationalists and cultural workers. The spread of Islam may also affect the attitude of the population to female labour. The situation where women work as managers or practise technical professions, which is normal for Russians, may evoke a negative reaction on the part of zealous Muslims and adversely affect job opportunities for Russian women. The problem of employment is very acute for Russian women as it is. In all the republics they are the first to be fired. Russian women living in a foreign ethnic environment constitute the most vulnerable stratum because they are not as familiar as Russian men with the language of the titular nationality and are more widely employed in public health, education, office work, and in general as white-collar workers; the percentage of women among skilled blue-collar workers is small.

The problem of employment, education and professional training is no less acute for young Russians living in the former Soviet non-Russian republics. Starting with the 1960s and up to the end of the 1980s, the number of Russian university and college students declined steadily in all the republics. The curtailment in the past few years of Russian-language tuition in technical schools and institutes of higher learning, can be expected to exacerbate this trend.

What solutions can be offered, what are the employment prospects for Russians who have suddenly found themselves living in a foreign country? Much will depend on the economic and political orientation of the former union republics, the rate of development of market relations within these countries, the steps that will be taken to solve the problems of the non-titular population and to improve inter-ethnic relations.

Judging by the results of the ethno-sociological survey in Kirgizstan, the majority of the local Russian population is at a parting of the ways and is not taking any decisive steps to change jobs, profession, or place of residence. And this is probably the case in the other Central Asian states. A solution may be gleaned from the answers of respondents to the question of how they would advise young Russians about to make their way in life.Significantly, only 14% of Russians would advise them to leave Kirgizstan, while a much larger proportion (31%) suggested that young Russians should study Kirgiz and Kirgiz culture and become fully-fledged citizens of the country with equal opportunities for social advancement. Very significantly, 60% of the Kirgiz chose the latter variant for young Russians and only 12% suggested that they should leave the republic.

On the whole, Russians are highly qualified, possess organizational potential, technical skills, and extensive business contacts in various regions of the Soviet Union and beyond its borders. Their chances to reconstruct their lives and find appropriate jobs both inside their republic and outside it are still quite good. The most favourable situation seems to obtain today in Kazakhstan, where the influence of Islam is weaker, economic reorganization is more intensive and Russian skilled workers, who constitute a considerable portion of the Russian population, are already widely employed both in those branches of heavy industry that are changing their profile and in other spheres of the economy. In Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan the development of market relations is marking time for a number of reasons. The signs are that the going will be harder for the local Russian population in these republics: most of them are white-collar workers or employed in heavy industry, and as such have experienced a greater psychological shock from the loss of their social status, in addition to differing more sharply from the titular nationality regarding their spheres of employment. The large - as compared with the titular population - share of people employed in these types of work has changed for the Russians at the present post-communist period from a positive feature, from the point of view of their social status, to a negative one, for precisely these fields of employment were subject to the greatest depression.

The Ethno-Cultural Situation

In the former USSR Russians enjoyed for decades the comfortable status of a people dominating all the major socio-cultural areas. The Russian language and culture were reference components of all culture that was transmitted forcibly from the centre to the periphery via the educational system, the mass media, party and government structures, and especially via the system of training managerial and intellectual elites, and military service. Under these circumstances, Russians residing in the union republics had no weighty motivation to learn the languages of the titular nationalities and integrate into the non-Russian ethno-cultural environment.

Apart from the socio-political and language situation that was comparatively favourable for the local Russians, possibilities for meeting their wider cultural requirements also existed in Central Asia and Kazakhstan up until the USSR's disintegration. All levels of education were available in Russian, the media and cultural activities (cinema, theatre, libraries, etc.) were predominantly Russian. Russian was the language of office work and the social services.

As a result, in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, Russians (about half of whom were first generation settlers) basically retained their cultural profile, even though influenced to an extent by some of the local population's values. As far back as the 1970s, for instance, analysts noted that Central Asian Russians married at an earlier age than in other regions, especially as compared with the Baltic republics. This undoubtedly was influenced by the marriage behaviour of the local nationalities. (8)

Although there were intensive inter-ethnic contacts and a high level of linguistic Russification in all former Soviet republics, in this region the Russians and the titular population kept at a cultural distance from one another and were in effect isolated communities with their own social niches and circles of everyday contacts. Mixed marriages between Russians and people of the local nationalities were and remain rare. (9) Marriages between Russians and Ukrainians, Germans, Tatars and Koreans are much more frequent. The percentage of Russians with a free command of the titular nationality's language is insignificant, from 4.5% in Uzbekistan to 0.9% in Kazakhstan, as compared with 38 and 34%, respectively, in Lithuania and Armenia.

Russians have preserved their traditional culture in everyday life, rites, behaviour (especially in rural areas). The Orthodox churches that exist in the towns and some villages are an important rallying factor for the Russian population. Most Russian folk traditions and rites are performed strictly within their own communities and their Muslim neighbours often do not even know of their existence. At the same time, especially in areas where Russians do not comprise more than a small percentage of the overall population, many traditions connected with popular holidays have disappeared and many religious festivals are on the way to oblivion. (10) Among the Russian population some of the descendants of those who came to live in the region before the revolution and before the war comprise a group unto themselves. They are better acquainted with the language, culture and everyday life of the indigenous peoples, and are more tolerant. More often than not they see Central Asia or Kazakhstan, where they or their parents or even grandparents were born and many of their relatives are buried, as their "little homeland". (11) Yet both Russian old-timers and recent migrants have an increasingly keen ethnic consciousness and are worried by the disregard of the state authorities for their national, cultural and religious requirements and by the growing Islamicization and traditionalism in official circles.

The vigorous manifestation of sovereignty in the realm of language, which has been a major instrument for the titular group to assert its dominant political and socio-cultural status, has proved an especially sensitive issue for the local Russians. In reply to the question concerning the law on the state language, the overwhelming majority of Russians in Tashkent (79%) said they would prefer to have two state languages: Uzbek and Russian. The Russian population is deeply worried by the speed with which the law has been implemented - signboards in public transport (in the Underground, as well as in above-ground transport), timetables, etc., street signs, office work in public institutions (the medical, educational and industrial establishments) are now only in Uzbek.

In Kirgizstan, too, the Russian population is greatly concerned over the status of the Russian language following the adoption of the language law. Over two-thirds of those polled (68%) said the law had changed the position of the Russians. Just one-fifth said the law had not in fact changed anything and the rest were either undecided or refused to answer. Most of those polled said the law had first and foremost had an adverse effect on the Russians' social status, i.e., it makes it more difficult to enter institutions of higher education (24%), limits job and promotion opportunities (17 and 16% respectively), and increases the chances of being sacked (12%). Sixteen per cent said the law had created difficulties in everyday communication with the Kirgiz. Only seven per cent said that making Kirgiz the state language had diminished the quantity of information available in Russian. Fifteen per cent of the Russian respondents found positive aspects in the law, namely, that it made Russians realize the need to study Kirgiz.

The survey of the Russian urban population in Kirgizstan testifies to their overwhelming concern that there should be continued full use of the Russian language in education, culture and the media. Over 80% of the respondents favoured the preservation of higher and specialized secondary educational establishments in Russian, 80% were for the preservation of the Russian theatre, and 90% for TV broadcasting in Russian.

Over a quarter of those polled in Tashkent (27%) said it was necessary to have more Russian-language theatres, one-third believed that opportunities for receiving higher education in Russian must be augmented, over two-thirds (68%) said that the TV broadcasting time in Russian should be increased. A vast majority (92%) favoured resuming broadcasts of the Russian TV channel discontinued in August 1991.

At the same time, concern over the fall in status of the Russian language and Russian culture does not mean that the Russian population of Central Asia is unwilling to master the languages of the titular nations. There is, indeed, a growing awareness among Russians that, if they want to stay in the newly emerged, sovereign states of Central Asia, they must know their languages much better than they do now. This is corrobarated by the answers given by Russians living in Tashkent to the question: what is the preferable way of improving inter-ethnic relation in Uzbekistan today - that Russians learn Uzbek or that Uzbeks learn Russian better? thirty-six per cent favoured the first against half that figure who favoured the second. True, over one-third of the respondents were unable to decide one way or the other.

Most of the Russians in Tashkent and Russian urban dwellers in Kirgizstan assess realistically the negative consequences of their inadequate knowledge of the language of the titular nationality. Only slightly more than a quarter of the respondents found it difficult to answer what negative consequences their inadequate knowledge of Uzbek or Kirgiz might have or said they personally did not see why they should learn these languages. The rest of the Russians polled in Tashkent said it complicated communication in the social sphere and in everyday life (54%), created career difficulties (26%), limited opportunities of receiving higher education (eight per cent). The question "Do Russians need the Kirgiz language?" was answered by the Russian urban population of Kirgizstan in Table 4. In other words, the most weighty argument in favour of knowing the language of the titular nationality is the threat of loss in their social status, on the one hand, and the difficulties encountered in adapts to cultural and everyday life, on the other.

Political Status and Inter-Ethnic Relations

The deterioration of inter-ethnic relations in Central Asia and Kazakhstan in recent years has been mainly caused by the upsurge in ethnic nationalism among the representatives of the titular groups and by inter-clan and inter-regional disputes that climaxed in a series of ethnic conflicts and even, in the case of Tajikistan, in a devastating civil war. Ethnic minorities deported to the region in an earlier period (such as the Meskhetian Turks in Uzbekistan) and groups of the autochtonous population living outside their own native republics (like the Uzbeks in Osh Oblast' in Kirgizstan) were the main victims of this violence. Even the civil strife in Tajikistan has clear ethnic overtones in that it hist hardest at representatives of the numerically small peoples of Gorno-Badakhshan.

Except for the 1990 events in Dushanbe, violence was not targeted at Russians. However, one of the features of the present-day social climate is that the blame for past injustices and crimes committed by the centre is now projected on the Russians, the dominant ethnic group in the former Soviet Union. Even after independence, the worsening economic situation and political instability are often blamed on the Kremlin's pernicious legacy and Russia's current actions, which serves to keep anti-Russian sentiments alive. These sentiments are often fanned by politicians and ethnic activists in order to rally and consolidate the "indigenous nations", rent as they are by internal dissension.

At the same time, the social transformations taking place in the region, which are accompanied at the present time by economic crisis, unemployment and inflation, that aggravate the situation primarily of the urban population, and naturally of the Russians, inasmuch as most of them are urban, are seen by the Russians as manifestly directed at "ousting" them from prestigious jobs and "forcing" them out of the republics in which they live. The enactment of the laws on language and citizenship, the shrinking of opportunities for children to get schooling in their mother tongue, anti-Russian nationalistic rhetoric and the actions of local radicals and fundamentalists affecting the Russians' everyday affairs evoke a painful psychological reaction among the Russians. The situation is further aggravated by occasional threats against "Europeans" and rumours about such threats that one hears ever more frequently. The alarmist rhetoric of Russia's media and the official orientation of certain government departments concerning the inevitable "exodus" of Russians from Central Asia also have a negative impact on the Russians' mood and behaviour.

The results of the ethno-sociological research in Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan have confirmed that the situation surrounding the Russian community in Central Asia is pregnant with conflict. The Russian and the titular populations are divided, for instance, in their assessment of the role Russians played in the life of the peoples of the USSR. The greater part of the Russian urban population in Kirgizstan (78%) believe that Russians always played a progressive role in the relations between the two peoples and in general helped other peoples. Just one-third of the Kirgiz respondents from among the urban population share this opinion. On the other hand, the view that Russians have always been bent on dominating other peoples is held by only three per cent of the Russians and more than a quarter (29%) of the Kirgiz. The view that Russians have not played a significant role in the life of the other peoples of the USSR is supported by seven per cent of the Russians and 17 per cent of the Kirgiz. There is a notable division, although less than over the previous question, on whether or not the policy of Russification was pursued in Kirghizstan, with 31% of the Russians and almost half (49%) of the Kirgiz answering in the affirmative and 43% of the Russians and 17% of the Kirgiz in the negative. The various changes in the position of the Russian population of the former Soviet, non-Russian republics following the disintegration of the USSR and the emergence of sovereign successor states, which the Russians assess as essentially negative, have also brought about a noticeable change in the attitude to the Russians on the part of the titular nationalities and the insjtitutions of power in the newly independent states. The survey of the Russian population of some of the Central Asian republics leaves no doubt as to the Russian opinion on that score. In Tashkent, for instance, more than two-thirds of the Russians believe that over the past few years the attitude of the local authorities to them has changed for the worse. Only seven per cent are of the opinion that it has improved, while 12% see no change. In Kirgizstan's urban centres the same opinion is held respectively by 48%, 11% and 33% of the Russians. The clearly divergent views on the question expressed by Russians in Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan stem from the essentially differing overall policy pursued by these countries and from their policy vis-a-vis the local Russian population. Approximately the same correlation exists among Russians in Tashkent and in Kirgizstan's urban centres in their assessment of the change in inter-ethnic relations on the everyday life level, the only difference being that the proportion of those who said these relations had improved or that there was no change was smaller than in the assessment of the situation on the official level.

One of the concrete manifestations of the negative turn in inter-ethnic relations is that people feel that their national pride is being affronted. Over half of the Russians in Tashkent said that they had experienced this recently and only about one-third said that they had not felt this. The respective figures for the Russians in Kirgizstan's urban centres were 27 and 42%. The proportion of respondents who could name concrete circumstances, instances, etc., that aroused such a feeling (in comparison with those who said they felt their national dignity was being trampled upon) was somewhat smaller. A large portion of the respondents (38% in Tashkent and 13% in Kirgizstan's urban centres) linked such situations in the main to depersonalized episodes in commercial enterprises, at the market, in public transport, etc. Comparatively few people said they had experienced this on the part of colleagues at work or during their studies or when addressing state institutions.

Significantly, only a small proportion of Russians - ten per cent in Tashkent and 17% in Kirgizstan - expect inter-ethnic relations in their respective republics to get better, while more than half (56% in Tashkent and 52% in Kirgiz urban centres) believe that they will get worse.

It is only natural that in this situation the Russian population should feel defenceless. As many as 72% of the Russians living in Kirgizstan's urban centres said that the Russians in the republic must be protected. Over half of the respondents think that this should be the responsibility of Kirgizstan's organs of power. Less than a third believe that the responsiblity lies with Russia. A far smaller percentage of those polled named other states or international institutions and public movements as the bodies that should take the responsibility of protecting the interests of the new Russian diaspora (Table 5).

The assessment of the role of Russian troops as potential defenders of the local Russian population was considerably lower than in answers to the question: "Will the position of the Russians in Kirgizstan change if Russian troops pull out?" Two per cent said that it would get a little worse and 17% said that it would get much worse.

Russia is expected to uphold the interests of the Russians primarily in the political, legal and economic fields (Table 6).

The appraisal of Russian policy on the part of the new Russian diaspora with respect to Russians in the newly emerged states, including those of Central Asia is influenced by a number of factors. One of the most important of these is the stand taken by Russia on the ultimate destiny of the USSR. A sizable percentage of the Russians in the newly emerged states disapprove of the Belovezhskaia Pushcha agreements that comprised the decision to dissolve the USSR and create the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The ethnocratic trends in the policy of these states serve to strengthen the negative view that their Russian inhabitants take of the USSR's disintegration and their opinion that the leadership of the new Russia is mainly responsible for this. Russia's inability, in view of its own economic difficulties to properly absorb those of its nationals who would like to leave the former constituent republics also serves to reinforce in the mass consciousness the stereotype notion that Russia dos not need them and has betrayed them. These sentiments presumably explain Yeltsin's low rating as against other CIS leaders, which polls of Russian urban dwellers in Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan have shown. Fourteen per cent of the Russians in Tashkent said that they fully trusted Yeltsin, as against Karimov and Nazarbaev who each got 26%. Yeltsin is mistrusted by 33%, Karimov by 16%, and Nazarbaev by eight per cent. The rating of CIS leaders with urban Russians living in Kirgisztan is found in Table 7.

In the geopolitical and ethno-political situation obtaining after the demise of the USSR and the formation of the new sovereign states, it would be unreasonable for the Russian leadership to ignore the problems of the Russian population and the rest of the Russian-speaking population in the "new abroad". Unquestionably, a balanced policy vis-a-vis these groups requires at least an idea of what measure of support they are likely to give it. Specifically, our information on the ethno-political orientation of the Russian population of Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan shows that the preservation of ties among the former union republics, both multilateral, within the framework of the CIS, and bilateral - between Russia and the other sovereign successor states - will doubtless enjoy the support of the Russian population in Central Asia.

The overwhelming majority of the Russians polled in Tashkent (96%) favoured Uzbekistan's joining the CIS (the poll was taken when the CIS was forming). They linked the preservation of the CIS with the stability of their own position. A third (33%) of the respondents believed that the situation of the Russian population would improve if Uzbekistan joined the CIS, and more than half of them hoped it would at least remain as it was. Seventy-six per cent of the respondents said that if Uzbekistan stayed out of the CIS, the situation of the Russians would worsen, while 18% believed there would be no appreciable change.

Opinion samples taken among Kirghizstan's urban dwellers revealed a similar ethno-political orientation. About half of those polled (44%) favoured developing Kirgizstan's foreign ties primarily within the CIS, 20% came out for a principally Russia-oriented policy and 14% preferred a trilateral alliance between Kirgizstan, Russia and Kazakhstan.

Dual citizenship - that of their country of residence and Russian - is seen by many Russians and people of associated nationalities as a way to stabilize their status. As many as 74% of Russians in Tashkent said they would like to have dual citizenship when asked what citizenship - Uzbekistan, Russian or dual - they would prefer. Russian citizenship was chosen by ten per cent and Uzbek by five per cent. The rest were undecided. Opinions were almost equally divided in answering the question that followed: "What citizenship would you prefer if you cannot get dual citizenship?" Forty-two per cent favoured Russian citizenship and 41%, Uzbek. In Kirgizstan the picture was somewhat different. Dual citizenship was also favoured by a majority, although by a considerably smaller one than in Uzbekistan - 58%. Fifteen per cent opted for Russian citizenship and the same exactly for that of Kirgizstan.

The answer to the question of what they believe to be their homeland - the former USSR as a whole, the republic in which they live or Russia - is also an indication of the ethnopolitical orientation of the Central Asian Russian population. Respectively, the response of those polled in Tashkent was 50%, 20% and 15%, and in Kirgizstan's urban centres 52%, 28%, and 12%. The rest gave no answer or were undecided. All this shows that the overwhelming majority of the Russian population in the Central Asian republics where opinion samples were taken, identify themselves with the USSR, an entity which has now become past history. It is clear that such an ethno-political orientation cannot but breed ethno-conflict situations, even though these have not yet surfaced.

All this means that the new socio-cultural and political status of the Russians in the former Central Asian republics has led a considerable part of them to adopt ethno-political positions that are significantly at variance with the stand taken by the leadership of the republics in which they live and by a large proportion of the titular nationalities. Judging by all the signs, the overwhelming majority of the Russians living in the newly emerged independent countries are unprepared and unwilling to accept the status of an ethnic minority. Presumably, the Russian population, hoping that their position will stabilize and reluctant to exacerbate their relations with the authorities and population of the titular nationality, is willing to adapt to the new socio-cultural and ethno-political conditions up to a certain point. But who can say beyond what point most Russians in the newly emerged states will refuse to go? The steadfast negative attitude of most Russians in the former constituent republics, apart from Russia, to the Russian leadership - for which there were and are objective reasons - further complicates their ethno-political situation. Only a resolute, unambiguous and basically consistent policy, understandable to Russians living in the territory of Russia's new neighbouring states, could dispel such sentiments.

The position of the Russians largely depends on the new states' current policies, which in turn are impacted by the economic situation in Russia. The governments of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kirghizstan and lately Uzbekistan realize full well that the exodus of Russians will lead to a tangible decline in their manufacturing and extraction industries and have taken a number of steps to quell the fears of their Russian population, ensure its safety and raise obstacles in the path of Russian emigration.

In Kirgizstan, for instance, a Slav University was opened in 1992. Moreover, in summer 1991 Akaev "vetoed" the article in the Land Law which proclaimed that the land was the "property of the Kirgiz people", having it replaced by a statement that the land was the property of all the republic's citizens. Organized activity of the Russians in Central Asia in defence of their rights and safety is weak, which is a reflection of the general behaviour of the Russian population in most of the non-Russian regions of the former Soviet Union.

Two, relatively minor, socio-political movements among the Russian and other Russian-speaking (primarily non-titular) population in the region are the Social Democratic Party and the Unity Movement (Edinstvo) in Kazakhstan, both of which champion civil equality and democratic reforms.

The Russian population of Uzbekistan has no organization of its own and is hardly interested in the Uzbek opposition. However, a few years ago, in 1989, a numerically small Intersoiuz organization was formed, which was a reaction of the Russian-speaking population to the growth of Birlik. The creation of Intersoiuz was in a way initiated by the authorities in Moscow and Tashkent and it was oriented towards the preservation of the Union. Yet at the beginning of 1990, these same authorities took repressive actions against it, its activity declined dramatically and by 1992 it no longer existed.(12)

Apart from the above-mentioned movements for civil rights and democracy, there are movements in the region which, with various degrees of emphasis, come out for the Russian national idea, but they do not enjoy any appreciable support. Movements of this kind are the Vozrozhdenie (Rebirth) association and the Ural Cossack Host in Kazakhstan. Only some of the Cossacks support the Russian idea. The principal goal of the Cossacks is the conservation of their own ethnic group identity and the struggle for Cossack autonomy. In Kirgizstan, a Slav Foundation has been officially registered. Initially, in 1990, its main concern was the status of the Russian language and it emphasized its non-political character. There is also a Landsmannschaft of Kirgizstan Cossacks which in 1992 had just a few dozen members. It is a reactionary group which supported the State Emergency Committee (GKChP) during the abortive coup of August 1991.

In May 1992, an attempt was made to set up a "Russian Community" in Turkmenistan but it was blocked by the authorities as unconstitutional. (13) Such a "Russian Community" in fact exists in Tajikistan. Its programme and main goals are typical of most of the organizations of the Russian-speaking population: they orient themselves towards the Russian government (previously, they as a rule supported the All-Union government), calling upon it to protect all Russians in the newly emerged states, to promote the introduction of dual citizenship, to continue economic ties with the region, to support industrial enterprises where the work-force is predominantly Russian, and to declare its responsibility for the fate of the Russians in Central Asia. (14)

The political inertia of the Russians in Central Asia is largely a result of their loss of hope regarding the prospects of their continued presence in the region. Emigration sentiments are preponderant everywhere except among the Russian-speaking inhabitants of most of Kazakhstan. In the past few years the outflow has sharply increased. The overwhelming majority of Russians have already left Tajikistan. In 1989-1991, 145,000 Europeans moved from Kirgizstan, although a third have returned. (15) In Turkmenistan, the negative migration balance in 1986 was 3,400 people and in the first six months of 1992 alone it exceeded 8,000. (16)

Russians prefer to go to those Russian industrial or agricultural regions, where it is relatively easy to get a job, to rent or buy housing, or where they have relatives. Their main destinations are the southern regions of European Russia, Krasnodar and Stavropol krai; and, secondly, Central Russia, Voronezh and Belgorod oblast's. Many move to Siberia, the Ural region, the Altai krai. Considerable numbers of emigrants came up against formidable difficulties in their new places of residence, and not a few returned, especially to Kirgizstan, where there are still many Russians and living standards are still tolerable despite the economic crisis.

The Russian government has taken a passive stand with respect to these Russian migrants. Only those who have the status of "refugees" or "forced migrants" (17) receive help or support, although some local authorities, interested in attracting a labour force, give them credits and land to build settlements.

The most dynamic people of working age, young people with specialized training who find it hard to get jobs, and parents concerned about their children's education are in the forefront of those who leave Central Asia. As a result, the natural are balance of the Russian population is being upset, with the proportion of older people increasing and the birthrate declining. Moreover, the intellectual potential of those remaining is in decline. Those "Europeans" with good prospects of settling outside Central Asia have already departed: in the ten years between the 1979 and 1989 censuses the net outflow amounted to 850,000. (18) The estimate for the 1990s is one million people, most of whom will move to Russia. (19) Much in this respect will depend on the policies of the Central Asian governments, which are interested, on the one hand, in retaining skilled personnel who are indispensable for the national economy, and, on the other, in providing jobs for today's unemployed and the tremendously increasing work-force.

References:

1. Use has been made in this paper,of the results of ethno-sociological surveys conducted in Uzbekistan in 1991 and Kirgizstan in 1992 by a group from the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IEA, RAS) composed of A.I.Ginzburg, L.V. Ostapenko, S.S.Savoskul and I.A.Subbotina, and materials provided by another member of the same institute, O.I. Brusina. The author wishes to express his profound gratitude to them. For an outline on the research of the above group and some of its results, see S.S.Savoskul (ed.), Russkie v novom zarubezhe: Sredniaia Aziia. Etnologicheskii ocherk (Moscow, 1993).

2. Iu.V. Arutunian and Iu.V.Bromlei (eds), Sotsial'no-kul'turnyi oblik sovetskikh natsii. Po rezul'tatam ethnosotsiologicheskogo issledovania (Moscow, 1986), pp.34-5, table 9.

3. L.Maksakova, Migratsiia naseleniia Uzbekistana (Tashkent, 1986), p.53.

4. Iu.V.Arutiunian (ed.), Russkie. Ethno-sotsiologicheskie ocherki (Moscow, 1992), p.52, Table 19.

5. Ibid., pp.96-96, table 3; pp. 122-4, tables 12,13.

6. R.N.Narzikulov, "Respubliki Srednei Azii za 70 let", Vostok, No.5 (1991), p.125.

7. Russkie. Etno-sotsiologicheskie ocherki, p.113, Table 9.

8. Iu.V.Bromlei (ed.), Sovremennye etnicheskie protsessy v SSSR. 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1977), pp.493 and 497, table 4.

9. Arutiunian. Russkie. Etno-sotsiologicheskie ocherki, pp.195-6, Table 21.

10. O.I.Brusina, "Vostochno-slavianskoe naselenie v sel'skikh raionakh Uzbekistana. Problemy adaptasii i mezhetnicheskikh vzaimodeistsvij", in A.N.Zhilina and S.V.Cheshko (eds), Sovremennoe razvitie etnicheskikh grupp Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana. Part 2 (Moscow, 1992), p.84.

11. A Soviet citizen, in addition to his "Soviet patriotism", had, or was supposed to have "local patriotism", an attachment to his "little homeland" or region of origin.

12. Sredniaia Aziia. Spravochnye materialy. Istoriia, politika, ekonomika (Moscow, 1992), p.18.

13. Sh. Kadyrov, "Diktatura i massovoye narusheniia prav cheloveka v Turkmenistane". Paper presented at an international scientific and practical conference "Rossiia i Vostok: problemy vzaimodeistvia" ("Russia and the East: Questions of Interaction"), Moscow, Dec. 1992.

14. See interview with the deputy chairman of the community, "Ia nikuda ne poedu". Argumenty i fakty, No. 92, 1992.

15. Sovremennaia obshchestvenno-politicheskaia situatsiia v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane/Issledovaniia po prikladnoi i neotlozhnoi etnologii, No.50 (Moscow, 1993).

16. Sh.Kadyrov, Op.cit.

17. Basically, those who received refugee status were people compelled to leave areas where hostilities had broken out (e.g., Tajikistan). People forced to migrate to Russia who accepted Russian citizenship qualified for "forced migrant" status.

18. V.I.Perevedentsev, "Raspad SSSR i problemy repatriatsii v Rossiiu", in S.G.Zdravomyshov (ed.), Bezhentsy (Moscow, 1993), p.155.

19. Ibid.